Japan
Intelligence and Security Agencies
JAPONYA
İSTİHBARAT VE GÜVENLİK AJANSLARI
Japon İstihbarat
servisleri, Asya kıtası ve tüm dünyada elektronik iletişim sistemlerini ve
elektronik güvenlik ekipmanlarını en ustaca kullanan, hatta bir çok
nano-teknolojik elektronik cihazın ve mekanizmanın da icadını üstlenmiş güçlü
altyapıya sahip kuruluşlardır.
Japonya,
organize suçlar ve teknoloji casusluğu faaliyetlerinin en yoğun olduğu
bölgelerin başında geldiğinden, özellikle “Japon mafya örgütü – YAKUZA” ve teknoloji casuslarına karşı ciddi
önlemler almakta, özellikle mafyaya karşı sıkı bir mücadele içerisinde
bulunmaktadır.
Kimi çevreler
Japon mafyasının, Japon güvenlik servisleri ile bazı konularda organik bağ
kurmadan iş birliği yaptığını iddia etselerde bu söylemler iddiadan öteye
gitmemektedir.
Günümüzde,
elektronik güvenlik ürünleri evimizden işyerimize kadar yaygın olarak
kullanılamkta, CCTV (Dijital Kamera) sistemleri, yangın alarm sistemleri,
hırsız alarm ve ihbar sistemleri, bariyer sistemleri, üst arama cihazları,
hassas noktalar için özel, harekete duyarlı dijital kameralar, bug tabir edilen
gizli dinleme cihazları ki bu cihazlar günümüzde çok uzak mesafelerden çok net
nokta dinleme imkanı sağlamakta aynı zamanda hem ses analizi özelliği hemde
dijital kayıt etme özelliği bulunmaktadır. Bunun yanında takip edilecek şahsı
GSM/GPRS-Global Position Research System (Bütünsel Coğrafi İzleme Sistemleri)
ile on line izleme imkanı veren sistemlerde mevcuttur. Böylece izlenecek
şahıs/şahıslar kendi bilgileri olmadan da 7*24 olarak izlenebilmekte, abiyane
tabiri ile her attığı adım bilinmektedir. Ayrıca elektro-manyetik ekipmanların
da kullanılması ile izlenecek kişiler “yakın fiziki takip” olmadan da
rahatlıkla hassas izlemeye alınabilmektedir.
Uydu
teknolojilerinin geldiği nokta ise oldukça etkileyicidir. Gelişmiş ülkeler
uydular vasıtası ile tehdit algılaması bulunan hassas bölgeleri çok net ve 0
veri kaybı ile izleyebilmekte, böylece bu bölgelerdeki tüm insan, ekipman vs…
hareketliliğini de yakından görebilmektedir.
Umarız dünyamız bir
daha asla bir savaş yaşamasın ! Ama, eğer bir savaş olacak ise bu savaşın
görünmez elektronik cihazlarla yapılacağını, dijital teknolojisi etkili
kullanan ülkelerin lehine sonuçlanma ihtimalinin fazla olduğunu da belirtmeden
geçmeyelim. Zira, sizlerinde iyi bildiği gibi karadan-havaya, denizden-havaya
birçok uzaktan kontrollü füze ve cihazlar bu teknolojinin sadece ve sadece
küçük bir bölümüdür.
Bu cihazların
amatör kullanım için olanları, web sitelerinde yada Uzakdoğu electro-shoplarda
(Tayvan, Kore gibi) tüketicilere de satılmaktadır. Ancak, sadece çok
profesyonel olan ekipmanlar gizli servislerin hizmetinde kullanımda olup bu
cihazların servis mensubu olmayanlar tarafından bulundurulması ve kullanımı
yasaklanmıştır. Aynı zamanda bu cihazların özel izin olmadan başka bir ülkeye
kullandırılması da aynı yasak kapsamındadır.
Tüm bu
anlattıklarımızın ışığında, SONY, AKAI, NOKIA gibi bir çok teknoloji devini
bünyesinde barındıran ve dünya ölçeğinde milyonlarca tüketici kapasitesine
ulaşmış Japon Güvenlik Servisleri de bu dijital dünyadan oldukça memnun
bulunuyorlar.
Daha detaylı
bilgi için;
LİNK : http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/japan
VE LİNK : http://www.fas.org/irp/world/japan/
adreslerine bakabilirsiniz…
JAPON
GÜVENLİK VE İSTİHBARAT KURULUŞLARI’NI TANIYALIM…
- 1. Public Security
Investigation Agency [Koancho] - Toplum
Güvenliği ve Araştırma Ajansı - 2. Ministry of Justice
(Homusho) - Adalet
Bakanlığı - 3. Intelligence and
Analysis Bureau - İstihbarat
ve Analiz Bürosu - 4. Information
Analysis, Research and Planning Bureau - Veri
Analizi, Araştırma ve Planlama Bürosu - 5. Security Bureau
- Güvenlik
Bürosu - 6. National Police
Agency (NPA) – (Keisatsuchô) - Ulusal
Polis Ajansı (NPA) - 7. National Police
Safety Commission (NPSC) - Ulusal
Polis Güvenliği Komisyonu (NPSC) - 8. Intelligence
Division – Tactical Reconnaissance Group - İstihbarat
Dairesi – Taktik Keşif Grubu - 9.. Fleet Intelligence
Command - Filo
İstihbarat Komutanlığı - 10. Japan Maritime
Self Defence Force – Nihon Kaijyo
Jieitai - Japonya
Deniz Savunma Kuvvetleri - 11.
Japan Ground Self Defence Force – Nihon Rikujyo Jieitai
Japonya
Kara Kuvvetleri
JAPONYA BİLGİ
AĞI NETWORK MAIL ADRESİ : mailto : jinmaster@jcic.or.jp
JAPONYA GÜVENLİK
AKADEMİSİ MAIL ADRESİ : mailto : webmaster@nda.ac.jp
JAPONYA SAVUNMA
KUVVETLERİ MAIL ADRESİ : mailto : info@jda.go.jp
Defence
Intelligence Headquarters (DIH)
Defence
Intelligence Office DIO
[Jouhou Honbu] –
JAPON SAVUNMA OFİSİ – DIO
LİNK : http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/japan/jda.htm
– Defense Agency / Japan Self-Defense Force (Bôeichô)
Security Council
The Security
Council was established in July 1986. The council is presided over by the prime
minister and includes the ministers of state specified in advance in Article 9
of the Cabinet Law; the foreign minister, the finance minister, the chief
cabinet
secretary, the chairman of the National Public Safety Commission, the director
general of the Defense Agency, and the director general of the Economic
Planning Agency. The chairman of the Security Council also can invite the
chairman of the Joint Staff Council and any other relevant state minister or
official to attend. Replacing the National Defense Council, which had acted as
an advisory group on defense-related matters since 1956, the Security Council
addresses a wider range of military and nonmilitary security issues, including
basic national defense policy, the National Defense Program Outline, the
outline on coordinating industrial production and other matters related to the
National Defense Program Outline, and decisions on diplomatic initiatives and
defense operations.
In the postwar
political system, executive power has been vested in the cabinet. The cabinet
head is the prime minister, responsible for appointing and dismissing other
cabinet members. Cabinet ministers include those appointed to head the twelve
ministries, and the ministers of state placed in charge of the agencies and
commissions of the Office of the Prime Minister, which itself has the status of
a ministry. They include the director general of the Defense Agency, equivalent
to a minister of defense but lacking ministerial status (a reflection of the
Article 9 renunciation of war). Also among the ministers of state are the chief
cabinet secretary, who coordinates the activities of the ministries and
agencies, conducts policy research, and prepares materials to be discussed at
cabinet meetings, and the director of the Cabinet Legislative Bureau, who
advises cabinet members on drafting the legislation to be proposed to the Diet.
Although the chief cabinet secretary does not have ministerial rank, the
position is influential within the cabinet because of its coordination role
Cabinet Research
Office
[Naicho – Naikaku Chosashitsu Betsushitsu]
Japan’s central
intelligence agency is the Naicho, a small section of the Prime Minister’s
Office staffed by some 80 personnel who analyze information from abroad. It is
supposed to act as a coordinating agency for other groups in the government,
but critics say it does not. Critics suggest that this office is rather
ineffectual, spending most of its effort on outside researchers and professors
translating newspaper articles and official documents from abroad. Other
critics, from a different perspective, have charged [not entirely credibly]
that the office is being strengthened to conduct surveillance on citizen
activists.
Japan
Defense Agency (Bôeichô)
Japan
Self-Defense Force
LİNK : http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/japan/jda.htm
– Defense Agency / Japan Self-Defense Force (Bôeichô)
LİNK : http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/japan/dio.htm
– Defence Intelligence Office DIO [Jouhou Honbu]
Defence
Intelligence Office DIO
[Jouhou
Honbu] – JAPON SAVUNMA OFİSİ – DIO
The Bureau of
Defense Policy is responsible for drafting defense policy and programs, for
determining day-to-day operational activities, and for information gathering
and analysis in the SDF. A research office in the DA’s Bureau of Defense Policy
was created in July 1998, responsible for making recommendations on security
and defense policy. Although there is also a section in MOFA in charge of
security policy, this new office reflected a change in the previous formula
under which MOFA was in charge of policy, while the DA dealt with the
operational backup. Previously, the DA was preoccupied with managing the SDF.
The intent was that the DA will develop into a policymaking organ through its involvement
with policy research.
Within the
Bureau of Defense Policy, the First Intelligence Division in charge of domestic
intelligence recently changed its name to the Intelligence Division, and the
Second Division in charge of foreign intelligence changed its name to the
International Planning Division.
Japan is a major
world economic and political power, with an aggressive military tradition,
resisting the development of strong armed forces. A military proscription is
included as Article 9 of the 1947 constitution stating, “The Japanese
people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat
or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.” That
article, along with the rest of the “Peace Constitution,” retains
strong government and citizen support and is interpreted as permitting the
Self-Defense Forces (SDF), but prohibiting those forces from possessing nuclear
weapons or other offensive arms or being deployed outside of Japan.
The Defense
Agency and the SDF both comprise the same defense organization. However, the
term Defense Agency is used to denote an administrative organization
responsible for the management, operation, etc., of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF,
while the term SDF is used to mean armed organizations that conduct unit
activities for the defense of the nation and for other purposes. The SDF are
under control of the civilian Defense Agency, subordinate to the prime
minister. Although highly trained and fully qualified to perform the limited
missions assigned to them, the SDF are small, understaffed, and underequipped
for more extensive military operations. Its activities are confined to disaster
relief and limited UN peacekeeping efforts.
Following World
War II Japan’s Imperial Army and Navy were dissolved, and the old regime was
replaced with a democratic government. Article 9 of the new Constitution of
Japan renounced war or even possessing combat potential. However, the Cold War
and the Korean War forced Japan to reestablish defensive capabilities. A constitutional
interpretation of Article 9 grants Japan the inherent right of self-defense and
the possession of the minimum armed strength needed to exercise that right.
Having renounced
war, the possession of war potential, the right of belligerency, and the possession
of nuclear weaponry, Japan held the view that it should possess only the
minimum defense necessary to face external threats. Within those limits, the
Self-Defense Forces Law of 1954 provides the basis from which various
formulations of SDF missions have been derived. The law states that ground,
maritime, and air forces are to preserve the peace and independence of the
nation and to maintain national security by conducting operations on land, at
sea, and in the air to defend the nation against direct and indirect
aggression.
To avoid the
appearance of a revival of militarism, Japan’s leaders emphasized
constitutional guarantees of civilian control of the government and armed
forces and used nonmilitary terms for the organization and functions of the
forces. The overall organization was called the Defense Agency rather than the
Ministry of Defense. The armed forces were designated the Ground Self-Defense
Force (GSDF), the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), and the Air Self-Defense
Force (ASDF), instead of the army, navy, and air force.
Based on the
Self-Defense Forces Law of 1954, the nation’s defense establishment is
organized to ensure civilian control of the armed forces. The result has been a
unique military system. All SDF personnel are technically civilians: those in
uniform are classified as special civil servants and are subordinate to the
ordinary civil servants who run the Defense Agency. There is no military
secrets law, and offenses committed by military personnel- -whether on base or
off base, on duty or off duty, of military or nonmilitary nature–are all
adjudicated under normal procedures by civil courts in appropriate
jurisdictions.
The general
framework through which these missions are to be accomplished is set forth in
the Basic Policy for National Defense adopted by the cabinet in 1957; it
remains in force. According to this document, the nation’s security would be
achieved by supporting the United Nations (UN) and promoting international
cooperation, by stabilizing domestic affairs and enhancing public welfare, by
gradually developing an effective self-defense capability, and by dealing with
external aggression on the basis of Japan-United States security arrangements,
pending the effective functioning of the UN.
Japan’s national
defense policy has been based on maintaining the 1960 Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security with the United States, under which Japan assumed
unilateral responsibility for its own internal security and the United States
agreed to join in Japan’s defense in the event that Japan or its territories
were attacked. Although the size and capability of the SDF have always limited
their role, until 1976 defense planning focused on developing forces adequate
to deal with the conventional capabilities of potential regional adversaries.
Beginning in 1976, government policy held that the SDF would be developed only
to repel a small-scale, limited invasion and that the nation would depend on
the United States to come to its aid in the event of a more serious incursion.
The Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the buildup of military forces in the
Soviet Far East, including a group of islands to the north of Hokkaido, which
were occupied by the Soviet Union but claimed by Japan, led Japan to develop a
program to modernize and improve the SDF in the 1980s, especially in air
defense and antisubmarine warfare. In the early 1990s, the government was
reevaluating its security policy based on reduced East-West tensions.
The very general
terms in which military missions are couched left specifics open to wide
interpretation and prompted the criticism that the nation did not possess a
military strategy. In the 1976 National Defense Program Outline, the cabinet
sought to define missions more specifically by setting guidelines for the
nation’s readiness, including specific criteria for the maintenance and
operation of the SDF. Under these guidelines, in cases of limited and
small-scale attack, Japanese forces would respond promptly to control the
situation. If enemy forces attacked in greater strength than Japan could
counter alone, the SDF would engage the attacker until the United States could
come to its aid. Against nuclear threat, Japan would rely on the nuclear
deterrence of the United States. To accomplish its missions, the SDF would
maintain surveillance, be prepared to respond to direct and indirect attacks,
be capable of providing command, communication, logistics, and training
support, and be available to aid in disaster relief.
The outline
specified quotas of personnel and equipment for each force that were deemed
necessary to meet its tasks. Particular elements of each force’s mission were
also identified. The GSDF was to defend against ground invasion and threats to
internal security, be able to deploy to any part of the nation, and protect the
bases of all three services of the Self-Defense Forces. The MSDF was to meet
invasion by sea, sweep mines, patrol and survey the surrounding waters, and
guard and defend coastal waters, ports, bays, and major straits. The ASDF was
to render aircraft and missile interceptor capability, provide support fighter
units for maritime and ground operations, supply air reconnaissance and air
transport for all forces, and maintain airborne and stationary early warning
units.
The Mid-Term
Defense Estimate for FY 1986 through FY 1990 envisioned a modernized SDF with
an expanded role. While maintaining Japan-United States security arrangements
and the exclusively defensive policy mandated by the constitution, this program
undertook moderate improvements in Japanese defense capabilities. Among its
specific objectives were bettering air defense by improving and modernizing
interceptor-fighter aircraft and surface-to-air missiles, improving
antisubmarine warfare capability with additional destroyers and fixed-wing
antisubmarine patrol aircraft, and upgrading intelligence, reconnaissance, and
command, control, and communications. Most of the goals of this program were
met, and the goals of the Mid-Term Defense Estimate for FY 1991 through FY 1995,
although building on the early progam, were considerably scaled back.
The SDF disaster
relief role is defined in Article 83 of the Self-Defense Forces Law of 1954,
requiring units to respond to calls for assistance from prefectural governors
to aid in fire fighting, earthquake disasters, searches for missing persons,
rescues, and reinforcement of embankments and levees in the event of flooding.
The SDF has not been used in police actions, nor is it likely to be assigned
any internal security tasks in the future.
In June 1992,
the National Diet passed a UN Peacekeeping Cooperation Law which permitted the
SDF to participate in UN medical, refugee aid, transportation, infrastructural
repair, election-monitoring, and policing operations under strictly limited
conditions. This law was used in 1992- 93 to authorize the deployment of 600
SDF and seventy-five police personnel for UN engineering and
election-monitoring projects in Cambodia and again in the spring of 1993 to
send fifty-three persons to participate in peacekeeping operations in
Mozambique.
The Defense
Agency, aware that it could not accomplish its programs without popular
support, paid close attention to public opinion. Although the Japanese people
retained a lingering suspicion of the armed services, in the late 1980s
antimilitarism had moderated, compared with its form in the early 1950s when
the SDF was established. At that time, fresh from the terrible defeat of World
War II, most people had ceased to believe that the military could maintain peace
or serve the national interest. By the mid-1970s, memories of World War II had
faded, and a growing number of people believed that Japan’s military and
diplomatic roles should reflect its rapidly growing economic strength. At the
same time, United States-Soviet strategic contention in the area around Japan
had increased. In 1976 Defense Agency director general Sakata Michita called
upon the cabinet to adopt the National Defense Program Outline to improve the
quality of the armed forces and more clearly define their strictly defensive
role. For this program to gain acceptance, Sakata had to agree to a ceiling on
military expenditures of 1 percent of the gross national product and a
prohibition on exporting weapons and military technology. The outline was
adopted by the cabinet and, according to public opinion polls, was approved by
approximately 60 percent of the people. Throughout the remainder of the 1970s
and into the 1980s, the quality of the SDF improved and public approval of the
improved forces went up.
In November
1982, when the Defense Agency’s former director general, Nakasone Yasuhiro,
became prime minister, he was under strong pressure from the United States and
other Western nations to move toward a more assertive defense policy in line
with Japan’s status as a major world economic and political power. Strong
antimilitarist sentiment remained in Japanese public opinion, however,
especially in the opposition parties. Nakasone chose a compromise solution,
gradually building up the SDF and steadily increasing defense spending while
guarding against being drawn beyond self-defense into collective security. In
1985 he developed the Mid-Term Defense Estimate. Although that program had
general public backing, its goals could not be met while retaining the ceiling
of 1 percent of GNP on military spending, which still had strong public
support. At first the government tried to get around the problem by deferring
payment, budgeting only the initial costs of major military hardware. But by
late 1986, it had become obvious that the 1 percent ceiling had to be
superseded. Thus, on January 24, 1987, in an extraordinary night meeting, the
cabinet abandoned this ceiling. A March 1987 Asahi Shimbun [Tokyo] poll
indicated that this move was made in defiance of public opinion: only 15
percent approved the removal of the ceiling and 61 percent disapproved. But a
January 1988 poll conducted by the Office of the Prime Minister reported that
58 percent approved the defense budget of 1.004 percent of GNP for fiscal year 1987.
During 1987 the
Japanese government reviewed ways in which it could assist friendly forces in
protecting shipping in the Persian Gulf. Several possibilities were seriously
considered, including sending minesweepers to the gulf. But, in the end, the government
determined that sending any military forces to the gulf would be unacceptable
to the Japanese people. Instead, the Japanese government agreed to fund the
installation of radio navigation guides for gulf shipping.
Appreciation of
the SDF continued to grow in the 1980s, with over half of the respondents in a
1988 survey voicing an interest in the SDF and over 76 percent indicating that
they were favorably impressed. Although the majority (63.5 percent) of
respondents were aware that the primary purpose of the SDF was maintenance of
national security, an even greater number (77 percent) saw disaster relief as
the most useful SDF function. The SDF therefore continued to devote much of its
time and resources to disaster relief and other civic action. Between 1984 and
1988, at the request of prefectural governors, the SDF assisted in
approximately 3,100 disaster relief operations, involving about 138,000
personnel, 16,000 vehicles, 5,300 aircraft, and 120 ships and small craft. In
addition, the SDF participated in earthquake disaster prevention operations and
disposed of a large quantity of World War II explosive ordnance, especially in
Okinawa. The forces also participated in public works projects, cooperated in
managing athletic events, took part in annual Antarctic expeditions, and
conducted aerial surveys to report on ice conditions for fishermen and on
geographic formations for construction projects. Especially sensitive to
maintaining harmonious relations with communities close to defense bases, the
SDF built new roads, irrigation networks, and schools in those areas.
Soundproofing was installed in homes and public buildings near airfields.
Despite these measures, local resistance to military installations remained
strong in some areas.
On 24 May 1999,
the Japanese Diet (parliament) passed, with partial amendments, a set of
government-sponsored bills and a Japan-U.S. agreement, designed to ensure
effective implementation of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation
(the Guidelines legislation for short). The Guidelines legislation consists of
the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in
Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan (the Law Ensuring Peace and Security in
Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan for short), which went into force on 25
August 1999; the Agreement to Amend the Acquisition and Cross- Servicing
Agreement, which went into force on 25 September 1999; and the Amendment to
Article 100-8 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, which went into force on 28 May
1999. The passage of the Guidelines legislation has put the final touches to
the process of building a new framework of cooperation under the Japan-U.S.
security arrangements after the end of the Cold War, a process that had been
initiated by the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security of 1996.
With the passage
of the Guidelines legislation, it has become possible for Japan to support,
under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the activities of the U.S. forces in
“situations in areas surrounding Japan that have an important influence on
Japan’s peace and security” (situations in areas surrounding Japan), situations
short of a direct armed attack on Japan. In coming years, a Japan-U.S.
bilateral planning and work for building a “bilateral coordination mechanism,”
which are currently under way, will be carried out. Meanwhile, reactions and
fears expressed by East Asian countries regarding the new framework of
cooperation from the time the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security was
issued and to the passage of the Guidelines legislation suggest the growing
importance of promoting bilateral and multilateral security dialogue and
cooperation with these countries.
The Defense
Agency, as part of the Office of the Prime Minister, is required by Article 66
of the constitution to be completely subordinate to civilian authority. Its
head, the director general, has the rank of minister of state. He is assisted
by two vice directors general (vice ministers), one parliamentary and one
administrative; the Defense Facilities Administration Agency; and the internal
bureaus. The highest figure in the command structure is the prime minister, who
is responsible directly to the Diet. In a national emergency, the prime
minister is authorized to order the various components of the SDF into action,
subject to the consent of the Diet. In times of extreme emergency, that
approval might be obtained after the fact.
The internal
bureaus, especially the Bureau of Defense Policy, Bureau of Finance, and the
Bureau of Equipment, are often headed by officials from other ministries and
are the main centers of power and instruments of civilian control in the
Defense Agency. The Bureau of Defense Policy is responsible for drafting
defense policy and programs, for determining day-to-day operational activities,
and for information gathering and analysis in the SDF. The Bureau of Finance is
instrumental in developing the Defense Agency budget and in establishing
spending priorities for the Defense Agency and the SDF. The Bureau of
Equipment, organized into subunits for each of the military services, focuses
on equipment procurement. Before any major purchase is recommended to the Diet
by the Defense Agency, it has to be reviewed by each of these bureaus.
Below these
civilian groups is the uniformed SDF. Its senior officer is the chairman of the
Joint Staff Council, a body that included the chiefs of staff of the ground,
maritime, and air arms of the Self-Defense Forces. Its principal functions are
to advise the director general and to plan and execute joint exercises. The
three branches maintain staff offices to manage operations in their branches.
Although rank establishs echelons of command within the SDF, all three branches
are immediately responsible to the director general and are coequal bodies with
the Joint Staff Council and the three staff offices.
This structure
precludes the concentration of power of the pre1945 general staffs, but it
impedes interservice coordination, and there are few formal exchanges among
commanders from various branches. Moreover, some dissatisfaction has been
reported by highranking officers who feel they have little power compared with
younger civilian officials in the bureaus, who most often have no military
experience. To rectify this situation and to increase input by the SDF in
policy matters, in the early 1980s the Joint Staff Council was enlarged to
establish better lines of communication between the internal bureaus and the
three staff offices. A computerized central command and communications system
and various tactical command and communications systems were established,
linking service and field headquarters with general headquarters at the Defense
Agency and with one another.
In the 1980s,
efforts were also under way to facilitate a clear and efficient command policy
in the event of a crisis. The government stood by the principle that military
action was permitted only under civilian control, but in recognition that delay
for consultation might prove dangerous, ships of the MSDF began to be armed
with live torpedoes, and fighter-interceptors were allowed to carry missiles at
all times. Although aircraft had long been allowed to force down intruders
without waiting for permission from the prime minister, ships were still
required to receive specific orders before interdicting invading vessels. The
Defense Agency had recommended drawing up more complete guidelines to clarify
what action SDF combat units could take in emergencies.
Cooperation
between the SDF and other civilian agencies in contingency planning is limited.
No plans exists to ensure the support of civilian aircraft and merchant fleets
in times of crisis, even though the SDF transportation capabilities are
generally judged inadequate. In 1990 legislation was being studied to provide
the SDF with the ability to respond in emergency situations not specifically
covered by Article 76 of the Self Defense Forces Law.
SDF training
includes instilling a sense of mission. Personnel are provided with the
scientific and technical education to operate and maintain modern equipment and
with the physical training necessary to accomplish their missions. Modern
equipment is gradually replacing obsolescent matériel in the SDF. In 1987 the
Defense Agency replaced its communications system (which formerly had relied on
telephone lines of the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation) with a
microwave network incorporating a three-dimensional transmission system using a
communications satellite. Despite efforts to increase stocks, however, supplies
of ammunition and maintenance and repair parts in 1990 remained at less than
satisfactory levels.
The Defense
Agency relocated its main offices on 08 May 2000, leaving the entertainment
district of Roppongi for a 247.3 billion yen complex on the fromer site of the
Japanese Imperial Army’s Imperial Headquarters in Ichigaya, near Shinjuku. At
least 7,000 agency personnel with eight organizations e moved from the
40-year-old Minato-ku facility to the traditional Shinjuku-ku home of the
military. The 23-hectare site is home to a daytime work force of 8,500. The new
complex has five wings.
A-Wing is the
home of the military’s central nervous system, hosting the Joint Staff Council
and the Staff Offices for each of the three branches of the Self-Defense Forces
(SDF) – Ground, Maritime and Air. The wing has 23 floors, 19 of which are above
ground. The four basement floors house the central coordination center. Atop
the wing are two heliports where large helicopters can land
B-Wing hosts the
SDF’s communications corps and contains a massive, 220-meter-high
communications tower.
C-Wing is home
to intelligence divisions. The two buildings each have eight floors and four
basements.
D-Wing houses
the Defense Facilities Administration Agency and the Defense Agency’s Central
Procurement Office.
The Defense
Agency had used the Roppongi complex as its headquarters since 1960, when the
US military transferred buildings it constructed on the site to Japan. With the
agency’s departure, control of the Roppongi site reverted to the Ministry of
Finance.
The new building
of Defense Agency were completed at the old military academy’s site on top of
Ichigaya Hill (the site where Mishima Yukio committed suicide in 1971). The
Military Academy of the Japanese Imperial Army located on Ichigaya Heights
trained many cadets for about 60 years from the first year of the Meiji Era.
Following the start of war between Japan and the United States, the Ministry of
War, the General Staff Headquarters, the Department of Military Education, and
the army’s Central Government Agency all moved from Miyakezaka to Ichigayadai.
The “Tokyo trial” was held at this site to prosecute major war
criminals. A limited part of old military academy building is preserved as a
building for archives. A historical hall where the international war criminal
trials in Far East were held after the war was restored in the building.
Defence
Intelligence Headquarters (DIH)
Under the former
organizational structure of the Defense Agency, intelligence-related divisions
and sections were internal bureaus, such as the first and the second
intelligence division, the intelligence department for each of the chiefs of
staff for the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces [GSDF, MSDF, and
ASDF], the Central Data Command Unit, the Joint Staff Council’s Second Office,
and each unit’s information division. Each of these units separately mobilized
communications posts, naval vessels, and airplanes to collect and analyze
military intelligence pertaining to the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea. Each
unit was trying to collect information independently from images and published
sources, as well as from its “own” officers stationed abroad.
A plan to
centralize intelligence-gathering activities by consolidating the intelligence
departments of the three SDFs was proposed around 1988, when Seiki Nishihiro
became the vice-minister. Thwarted by the lack of cooperation and subordination
from the uniformed officers, centralization had to be postponed.
The National
Defense Program Outline which determines Japan’s defense capabilities, was
reviewed and newly established in December 1995. According to this review:
“Japan’s
defense structure must be capable of conducting warning and surveillance on a
continuous basis to detect any changes in circumstances as soon as possible, so
as to utilize this information for quick decision-making. It must be capable of
high-level intelligence gathering and analysis, including strategic
intelligence, through possession of diversified intelligence-gathering means
and mechanisms, and highly able intelligence specialists. Additionally, it must
possess a sophisticated command and communication capability and be able to
quickly and effectively conduct integrated defense operations from a joint
perspective.”
In May 1996,
Japan’s parliament passed a law authorizing creation of a central military
intelligence agency, the first of its kind since the country’s WWII defeat. The
Defence Intelligence Headquarters (DIH) collects, processes and analyses
information from remote listening devices operated by Japanese defence forces
in the air, on the ground and at sea, as well as satellite images, intelligence
supplied by friendly countries and public information such as foreign media
reports.
The
establishment of DIH in January 1997 was expected to enable the country to deal
with the rising uncertainties of the Asia-Pacific region in the post-Cold War
era. Information demand has been shifting from tactical information like
movements of the Soviet Far Eastern Army to high-quality strategic information.
Because the director of the headquarters can report directly to the prime
minister’s secretary, the risk management capability of the Prime Minister’s
Office will be improved.
The first
director was Army General Masahiro Kunimi, who was promoted from the commanding
general of the 10th Division. A 1965 graduate of the Defense Academy, he worked
in the intelligence field at the GSDF for many years. He served as a resident
defense officer at the Japanese Embassy in Beijing for three years from 1983.
The intelligence
headquarters is placed under the Joint Staff Council and is controlled by the
“Defense Intelligence Committee,” which consists of the permanent
vice-minister, the director of the Defense Bureau, the chairman of the Joint
Staff Council, and the chiefs of the GSDF, the MSDF, and the ASDF. The
committee determines the overall framework of international military
intelligence to be collected, and based on this basic plan, each division of
the intelligence headquarters will collect, analyze, and assess information
gathered from radio waves, images, and publications.
kota City.
The Defense
Facilities Administration Agency is a national government executive agency that
performs administrative work related to defense facilities, including:
acquisition, property management, construction work and local-resident measures
involving SDF facilities and facilities and areas of the U.S. Forces in Japan
(USFJ); labor management of Japanese employees at the USFJ; and compensation
for damage resulting from unlawful acts by the USFJ. The agency comprises the
head office and Defense Facilities Administration Bureaus, which serve as
regional branch offices. These bureaus are located in eight major cities across
the country — namely, Sapporo, Sendai, Tokyo, Yokohama, Osaka. Hiroshima,
Fukuoka and Naha.
JOINT STAFF
COUNCIL
The Joint Staff
Council supports the director general with respect to matters that require
collaboration such as basic procedures for issuing commands and orders to the
SDF at the time of its mobilization and coordination of joint SDF activities.
ULUSAL GÜVENLİK
AKADEMİSİ BAŞKANI : Masashi Nishihara
JAPON HAVA
SAVUNMA STRATEJİSİ – ÖRNEK ŞEMA 1
Japan Air Self
Defence Force – Nihon Koku Jieitai
Japan has a long
configuration from the north to the south with its population and industrial
centers concentrated in particular regions. In addition, as the Japanese
government maintains an exclusively defense-oriented policy, Japan is forced to
take a passive position at the early stage of the air incursions in which
invaders take the initiative. In order to defend the life and the property of
the Japanese people from invading aircraft and missiles under Japan’s
geographical characteristics and defense-oriented policy, the Air Self-Defense
Force should detect invading aircrafts and missiles as soon as possible and
destroy them as far from Japan as possible. So the ASDF should have capability
for vigilance and surveillance and for a quick counterattack to fight against
invading aircrafts and missiles. To put it more concretely, the ASDF must
possess aircraft control and warning units that consist of a network of radar
sites and airborne early warning capable of vigilance and surveillance
throughout the air space in and around Japan on a continuous basis, fighter
units and ground-to-air missile units to take immediate and appropriate steps
against violations of Japan’s territorial airspace and air incursions, units
capable of engaging in the interdiction of airborne or amphibious landing
invasions and air-support for land forces as necessary, and units capable of
effective operational supports including air reconnaissance, air transportation
and other operations as necessary.
JAPONYA TEKNİK
SİSTEMLER GELİŞTİRME VE ARAŞTIRMA MERKEZİ : http://www.jda-trdi.go.jp
CENTRAL CONTRACT
OFFICE : info@jda-cco.go.jp
Japan Ground
Self Defence Force – Nihon Rikujyo
Jieitai
The largest of
the three services, the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), operates under the
command of the chief of the ground staff, based in the city of Ichikawa, east
of Tokyo.
Strategy is
determined by the nation’s elongated insular geography, its mountainous
terrain, and the nearness of the Asian mainland. The terrain favors local
defense against invasion by ground forces, but protection of the approximately
15,800-kilometer coastline of the four main islands would present unique
problems in the event of a large-scale invasion. Potentially hostile aircraft
and missile bases are so close that timely warning even by radar facilities
might be difficult to obtain. Maneuver space is limited to such an extent that
ground defenses would have to be virtually in place at the onset of
hostilities. No point of the country is more than 150 kilometers from the sea.
Moreover, the straits separating Honshu from the other main islands restrict
the rapid movement of troops from one island to another, even though all major
islands are now connected by bridges and tunnels. Within each island, mountain
barriers and narrow roads restrict troop and supply movements. The key
strategic region is densely populated and highly industrialized central Honshu,
particularly the area from Tokyo to Kobe.
Japan has many
places suited for landing operations and is geographically located close to
neighboring countries on the continent. It is expected that an aggressor will
attempt to assure the safety of its landing forces by concentrating its naval
and air assets to secure overwhelming combat power at the time and on the point
they choose. It is extremely difficult, or practically impossible, for Japan to
have enough defense capability to repel all troops of an aggressor on the sea.
It would incur enormous and unbearable costs to build up such defense
capability. Consequently, we need to preserve an adequate ground defense
capability to destroy those aggressor troops on the ground who have succeeded
in their landing operation. A robust ground defense capability to repel an
aggressor, which might succeed in breaking through our maritime defense, will
enable us to maintain solid defense posture required for effective deterrence
against an aggression.
Intended to
deter attack, repulse a small invasion, or provide a holding action until
reinforced by United States armed forces, the ground element is neither
equipped nor staffed to offer more than a show of conventional defense by
itself. Antitank artillery, ground-to-sea firepower, and mobility were improved
and surface-to- ship missiles were acquired in the Mid-Term Defense Estimate
completed in FY 1990. The number of uniformed personnel is insufficient to enable
an immediate shift onto emergency footing. Instead, the ratio of officers to
enlisted personnel is high, requiring augmentation by reserves or volunteers in
times of crisis. In 1992, however, GSDF reserve personnel, numbering 46,000,
had received little professional training.
The personnel
strength of the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), which was originally 75,000,
has gradually but steadily increased to 110,000 in 1952, 130,000 in 1954, and
180,000 today.7 There are five armies, 13 divisions and two combined brigades
in the GSDF. Today’s posture of the GSDF was basically established in 1962 when
the second Defense Buildup Plan was executed.
Although
allotted 180,000 slots for uniformed personnel, in 1992 the force was
maintained at about 86 percent of that level (with approximately 156,000
personnel) because of funding constraints.
A division is
the largest organizational unit and is considered the basic unit. Being the key
unit in the army, it is responsible for defending a specific area. Meanwhile,
an army is the largest organizational unit under the direct control of the
Director General of the Defense Agency. It is composed of the army
headquarters, two to four divisions, supporting units and is responsible for
defending a certain region against the enemy’s direct and/or indirect
aggression.
The National
Defense Program Outline which determines Japan’s defense capabilities, was
reviewed and newly established in December 1995. Through a review of the troop
structure, the Self-Defense Personnel of the GSDF was reduced from the current
180,000 to 160,000.
Some units may
be staffed by new Self-Defense Force Reserve Personnel (Ready Reserve
Personnel) capable of being quickly mobilized and to create a high-quality and
effective system, will be established by 15,000 Ready Reserve Personnel, and
145,000 Regular Personnel.
A fundamental
review of the troop structure, previously consisting of 13 divisions and 2
combined brigades stationed nationwide, resulted in a balanced deployment of
divisions and brigades uniquely suited to the local circumstances of the area
where each unit is deployed. Present 4 divisions and 2 combined brigades will
be reorganized into new brigades. According to the Outline, the GSDF planned to
reduce the four divisions belonging to the Northern Army (two divisions), the
Northeastern Army (one division), and the Middle Army (one division) into
brigade size and mobilize them, while maintaining the two divisions belonging
to the Western Army as they are and turning the First Mixed Group into a
brigade.
Japan Ground
Self Defence Force Intelligence
Ground
Self-Defense Forces intelligence units include the Nibetsu Investigation
Division, the Second Section, and the 101st Survey Battalion.
Japan Maritime
Self Defence Force – Nihon Kaijyo
Jieitai
Two kinds of
operations are conducted by the Japan Maritime Self Defence Force [JMSDF] for
the purpose of defending Japan: securing maritime traffic and securing Japanese
territory. For Japan, which relies on foreign countries for the supply of
almost all energy and food, the influence to national life is quite serious in
case that maritime traffic is cut off. It can also be said that the impact to
the world economy is significant in such case. Therefore, the JMSDF must be
able to secure maritime traffic against attack by enemy submarines, surface
ships and aircraft by effectively combining each operation such as
surveillance, escort and defense of ports and straits. In case of aggression
which aims at territorial occupation, it is necessary to stop it at sea in
order to prevent direct damage to our territory. For that purpose, the JMSDF,
in cooperation with the JGSDF and the JASDF, contributes defense of Japan by
destroying enemy surface ships aircraft and, according to the situation, laying
mines around the expected landing place.
The nation is
vitally dependent on maintaining access to regional and worldwide shipping
lanes and fishing areas, but it is incapable of defending the sea routes on
which it relied. Its energy supplies came primarily from Middle Eastern
sources, and its tankers had to pass through the Indian Ocean, the Strait of
Malacca, and the South China Sea, making them vulnerable to hostilities in
Southeast Asia. Vulnerability to interception of oceangoing trade remained the
country’s greatest strategic weakness. Efforts to overcome this weakness,
beginning with Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko’s statement in May 1981 that Japan
would attempt to defend its sea lines of communication (SLOC) to a distance of
1,000 nautical miles, met with controversy. Within the Defense Agency itself,
some viewed a role for the MSDF in defending the SLOC as “unrealistic,
unauthorized, and impossible.” Even the strongest supporters of this
program allowed that constitutional and other legal restrictions would limit
active participation of the MSDF to cases where Japan was under direct attack.
Japan could, however, provide surveillance assistance, intelligence sharing,
and search-and-rescue support to United States naval forces.
The large volume
of coastal commercial fishing and maritime traffic limits in-service sea
training, especially in the relatively shallow waters required for mine laying,
mine sweeping, and submarine rescue practice. Training days are scheduled
around slack fishing seasons in winter and summer–providing about ten days
during the year. The MSDF maintains two oceangoing training ships and conducted
annual long-distance on-the-job training for graduates of the one-year officer
candidate school.
The naval
force’s capacity to perform its defense missions varies according to the task.
MSDF training emphasizes antisubmarine and antiaircraft warfare. Defense
planners believe the most effective approach to combating submarines entails
mobilizing all available weapons, including surface combatants, submarines,
aircraft, and helicopters, and the numbers and armament of these weapons were
increased in the Mid-Term Defense Estimate. A critical weakness remains,
however, in the ability to defend such weapons against air attack. Because most
of the MSDF’s air arm is detailed to antisubmarine warfare, the ASDF has to be
relied on to provide air cover, an objective that competes unsuccessfully with
the ASDF’s primary mission of air defense of the home islands. Extended patrols
over sea lanes are also beyond the ASDF’s capabilities. The fleet’s capacity to
provide ship-based anti-air- attack protection is limited by the absence of
aircraft carriers and the inadequate number of shipborne long-range
surface-to-air missiles and close-range weapons. The fleet is also short of
underway replenishment ships and seriously deficient in all areas of logistic
support. These weaknesses seriously compromise the ability of the MSDF to
fulfill its mission and to operate independently of the United States Air Force
and the United States Seventh Flee.
When two North
Korean spy boats were later discovered in Japanese territorial waters, Japanese
Naval Forces fired their guns in anger for the first time in 54 years.
The MSDF is
commanded by the chief of the maritime staff and includes the maritime staff
office, the self-defense fleet, five regional district commands, the
air-training squadron, and various support units, such as hospitals and
schools. The maritime staff office, located in Tokyo, serves the chief of staff
in command and supervision of the force. The self-defense fleet, headquartered
at Yokosuka, is charged with defense of all waters around the Japanese
Archipelago. It commands four escort flotillas (two based in Yokosuka and one
each in Sasebo and Maizuru), the fleet air force headquartered at Atsugi, two
submarine flotillas based at Kure and Yokosuka, two mine-sweeping flotillas
based at Kure and Yokosuka, and the fleet training command at Yokosuka.
Five district
units act in concert with the fleet to guard the waters of their jurisdictions
and provide shore-based support. District headquarters are located in Ominato,
Maizuru, Yokosuka, Kure, and Sasebo.
Fleet
Intelligence Command
The Japan
Maritime Self Defense Force Fleet Intelligence Command is headquartered at
Yokosuka base. As the home of the U.S. Navy’s Seventh Fleet, the Base, often
referred to as CFAY (Commander Fleet Activities Yokosuka), hosts 13 afloat
commands and more than 50 other shore commands and tennant activities. The
Imperial Japanese Navy had four principal navy yards – Kure, Sasebo, Maizuru,
and Yokosuka.
During World War
II, activities at the Yokosuka Navy Yard reached their peak. By 1944, the Yard
covered 280 acres and employed over 40,000 workers. In addition to the shipbuilding plant, the
yard also had a gun factory, ordnance and supply depots, a fuel storage
facility, a seaplane base and a naval air station.
Intelligence
Division – Tactical Reconnaissance Group
The Intelligence
Division of the Air Self-Defense Forces is Japan’s primary imagery and imagery
analysis organization. The ASDF possesses air reconnaissance units in order to
provide effective support for air operations through air reconnaissance
operations as necessary. The ASDF maintains one air reconnaissance squadron,
based in Hyakuri, to engage in air reconnaissance in case of aggression and
other eventualities.
A total of 17
F-14EJ Kais will be converted to the reconnaissance role, all being assigned to
the 501st Hikotai [Squadron] “Teisatsu Kokutai” based at Hyakuri.
This unit also uses the 12 remaining RF-4Es, ten of which are to Kai standards.
National Police
Safety Commission (NPSC)
The national
level police organizations are the National Police Safety Commission (NPSC) and
the National Police Agency (NPA). Since the NPSC makes basic policy and the NPA
administers police affairs, the NPSC has control over the NPA.
The NPSC is a
governmental body responsible mainly for the administrative supervision of the
police and coordination of police administration. It also oversees matters
relating to police education, communication, criminal identification, criminal
statistics and police equipment. To ensure its independence and neutrality, not
even the Prime Minister is empowered to direct and give orders to the NPSC.
The mission of
the National Police Safety Commission is to guarantee the neutrality of the
police by insulating the force from political pressure and to ensure the
maintenance of democratic methods in police administration. The commission’s
primary function is to supervise the National Police Agency, and it has the
authority to appoint or dismiss senior police officers. The commission consists
of a chairman, who holds the rank of minister of state, and five members
appointed by the prime minister with the consent of both houses of the Diet.
The commission operates independently of the cabinet, but liaison and
coordination with it are facilitated by the chairman’s being a member of that
body.
Japan’s police
are an apolitical body under the general supervision of independent agencies,
free of direct central government executive control. They are checked by an
independent judiciary and monitored by a free and active press. The police are
generally well respected and can rely on considerable public cooperation in
their work. Officials involved in the criminal justice system are usually
highly trained professionals interested in preventing crime and rehabilitating
offenders. They are allowed considerable discretion in dealing with legal
infractions and appear to deserve the trust and respect accorded to them by the
general public.
Conditions of
public order compare favorably with those in other industrialized countries.
The overall crime rate is low by North American and West European standards and
has shown a general decline since the mid-1960s. The incidence of violent crime
is especially low, owing in part to effective enforcement of stringent firearms
control laws. Problems of particular concern are those associated with a modern
industralized nation, including juvenile delinquency, traffic control, and
white-collar crime.
Civil disorders
occurred beginning in the early 1950s, chiefly in Tokyo, but did not seriously
threaten the internal security of the state. Far less frequent after the early
1970s, they were in all cases effectively countered by efficient and
well-trained police units employing the most sophisticated techniques of riot
control.
National Police
Agency (NPA) – (Keisatsuchô)
The Police Law,
enacted in 1945, in conforming with principles such as rule of law and local
autonomy, aims at providing an efficient police structure on a democratic base.
The police structure consists of the national police and the prefectural
police. Formerly, most police agencies functioned as guards for the imperial
family. Now, there is a mix of centralization and decentralization in that
police administration is the responsibility of prefectural governments.
The national
level police organizations are the National Police Safety Commission (NPSC) and
the National Police Agency (NPA). Since the NPSC makes basic policy and the NPA
administers police affairs, the NPSC has control over the NPA.
As the central
coordinating body for the entire police system, the National Police Agency
determines general standards and policies; detailed direction of operations is
left to the lower echelons. In a national emergency or large-scale disaster,
the agency is authorized to take command of prefectural police forces. In 1989
the agency was composed of about 1,100 national civil servants, empowered to
collect information and to formulate and execute national policies. The agency
is headed by a commissioner general who is appointed by the National Public
Safety Commission with the approval of the prime minister. The central office
includes the Secretariat, with divisions for general operations, planning,
information, finance, management, and procurement and distribution of police
equipment, and five bureaus. The Administration Bureau is concerned with police
personnel, education, welfare, training, and unit inspections. The Criminal
Investigation Bureau is in charge of research statistics and the investigation
of nationally important and international cases. This bureau’s Safety
Department is responsible for crime prevention, combating juvenile delinquency,
and pollution control. In addition, the Criminal Investigation Bureau surveyes,
formulates, and recommends legislation on firearms, explosives, food, drugs,
and narcotics. The Communications Bureau supervises police communications
systems.
The NPA
maintains Regional Police Bureaus as its local agencies throughout the country.
There are seven bureaus in the major cities, excluding Tokyo and the northern
island of Hokkaido. Police law stipulates that each prefectural government,
which is a local entity, shall have its own Prefectural Police (PP). The PP is
supervised by the Prefectural Public Safety Commission, which carries out all
police duties within the boundaries of the prefecture. In practice, the PP
forces are located in each of the 47 prefectures. The National Police Academy,
the National Research Institute of Police Science and the Imperial Guard
Headquarters are also organizations affiliated with the NPA.
The National
Police Agency has seven regional police bureaus, each responsible for a number
of prefectures. Metropolitan Tokyo and the island of Hokkaido are excluded from
these regional jurisdictions and are run more autonomously than other local
forces, in the case of Tokyo, because of its special urban situation, and of
Hokkaido, because of its distinctive geography. The National Police Agency
maintains police communications divisions in these two areas to handle any
coordination needed between national and local forces.
Security Bureau
The National
Police Agency’s Security Bureau formulates and supervises the execution of
security policies. It conducts research on equipment and tactics for
suppressing riots and oversaw and coordinates activities of the riot police.
The Security Bureau is also responsible for security intelligence on foreigners
and radical political groups, including investigation of violations of the
Alien Registration Law and administration of the Entry and Exit Control Law.
The bureau also implements security policies during national emergencies and
natural disasters. The National Police Agency’s First Public Safety Division
investigates radical leftists.
A secret unit in
the Japanese National Police Agency was set up to deal with contingencies
related to North Korea. It has recruited and trained North Koreans to gather
intelligence on Japan’s behalf. According to some reports, high-ranking members
of Chosen Soren, the North Korean residents’ organization in Japan, have been
recruited to work for Japan, performing such tasks as exposing North Korean
agents.
Intelligence and
Analysis Bureau
[Information Analysis, Research and Planning Bureau]
The Intelligence
and Analysis Bureau takes charge of the following matters: general management
of information on the international situation; general administration of
research affairs; research and surveys on foreign countries (except matters
under the charge of other bureaus), and; general analysis of the international
situation and collection of necessary information. The Intelligence and
Analysis Bureau is divided into the General Management Division, the First
Analysis Division and the Second Analysis Division.
In accordance
with the rising international status of Japan, the volume of activities of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been sharply increasing even before the end of
the Cold War, and this trend has become even more pronounced in recent years.
For example, during the 15 years between 1976 and 1992, the number of
diplomatic cables, the principal means of communication between the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Japan’s overseas establishments, increased by about eight
times. The Ministry made efforts in 1993 to strengthen its organization,
personnel and budget.
The Information
Analysis, Research and Planning Bureau was reorganized into the Intelligence
and Analysis Bureau, which specializes in information and analysis, in order to
strengthen and improve the intelligence function of the Ministry. The
reorganized Bureau plans and formulates a comprehensive policy on how the
Ministry as a whole collects, analyzes, manages and provides information. The
analysis system has also been further improved: to meet the increasingly
complex and volatile international situation, the functions of regional
analysis and item-wise analysis such as analysis of security situations are
being strengthened.
Ministry of
Justice (Homusho)
The Ministry of
Justice is in charge of a broad area of legal affairs, which include civil,
criminal, immigration and other matters. In particular, it takes charge of
nationality, family registration and registration of real estate, prosecution
of criminal cases, correction and rehabilitation of offenders, litigations
involving the interests of the State, immigration control and registration of
foreign residents, and the protection of the rights of citizens in general.
Thus the Ministry of Justice is primarily responsible for maintaining the legal
order of the country in which the rule of law is ensured.
While in the
pre-war days the Ministry of Justice (called as “Shihosho”) had
jurisdiction over all matters of judicial administration including supervision
over the court operation, after the end of World WarII, with the enforcement of
the New Constitution and the Court Organization Law as from May 3, 1947, the matters
pertaining to courts, including their administration, have been transferred to
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court independent of the Ministry of Justice.
With the
enforcement of the Law for Establishment of the Attorney General’s Office as
from February 15, 1948, the Attorney General’s Office (called as
“Homucho”) was established as the Supreme Legal Advisor to the Prime
Minister in charge of the administration of justice,replacing the Ministry of
Justice (Shihosho).
The new Office,
in addition to the work of the Ministry of Justice (Shihosho), was them
entrusted with the work of the examination of drafting of laws and regulations
and international treaties which had been under the jurisdiction of the
Legislative Bureau of the Cabinet, research and study of judicial and legal
systems of other countries as well as matters pertaining to civil and
administrative suits, and the work of the protection of human rights.
Through a number
of subsequent administrative reforms starting from the one of June 1, 1949 to
that of August 1, 1952, the Attorney General’s Office was abolished and the new
Ministry of Justice (called “Homusho”) was born,accompanied with
considerable organizational reforms, which included the abolition of the
Attorney General and Assistants system and the introduction of the system of
placing the Minister of Justice as head of the Ministry and Vice Minister of
Justice under him as in the case of other Ministries of the Government.
Now, the
Ministry is equipped with the Minister’s Secretariat, and seven bureaus such as
the Civil Affairs Bureau, the Criminal Affairs Bureau, the Correction Bureau,
the Rehabilitation Bureau, the Litigation Bureau, the Civil Liberties Bureau
and the Immigration Bureau. Although there have since been some changes,
basically this is the organizational structure of the Ministry of Justice as it
is today.
Public Security
Investigation Agency [Koancho]
A small
intelligence agency, the Public Security Investigation Agency of the Ministry
of Justice, handles national security matters both inside and outside the
country. Mainly involved in counter-espionage, its activities are not generally
known to the public. The Koancho was set up in 1952 as an agency to investigate
and control internal subversion. It is staffed by some 1,800 investigators. Its
activities focus mainly on the far left and right, as well as the Japan
Communist Party, which was its main target during its early years. In addition,
it is probably the single group in Japan that is most responsible for surveillance
of resident Koreans At present, it is focusing its surveillance on Aum
Shinrikyo, partly in a move to gain increased legitimacy.
With the
Subversive Activities Prevention Law coming into force on 21 July 1952, Public
Security Investigation Agency was established on the same date based on this
law as an executive organization which is tasked to execute comprehensive
duties that include conducting of investigations and requesting for action in
reference to control of subversive organizations based on the provisions of the
law. The Subversive Activities Prevention Law has objectives of taking such
measures as control of activities or even dissolution of such organizations as
deemed necessary, imposing appropriate penalty to individuals who committed violent
subversive activities, and protecting democracy, basis of the Japanese people
to enjoy peaceful and secured living.
The Public
Security Investigation Agency comprises internal departments, an institute,
regional bureaus and prefectural offices. Internal departments are the General
Affairs Department, First Investigation Department and Second Investigation
Department, institute being the Training and Research Institute and there are
eight (8) regional Public Security Investigation Bureaus and forty-three (43)
prefectural Public Security Investigation Offices throughout the country as
field offices.
The Public
Security Investigation Agency is set up with the purpose of contributing to
insuring security of the public. Among its key tasks are to conduct
investigations based on the Subversive Activities Prevention Law into
organizational structure and activities of organizations that harbor intentions
of destroying the democratic system guaranteed by the Japanese Constitution
through violent means, and in the event it was determined that the results of
investigations meet the requirement of the law, and that some control measures
including dissolution are necessary, it is the task of the Public Security
Investigation Agency to forward a request for control measures to the Public
Security Examination Commission.
The control of
organization is an administrative measures to be taken against an organization
that ignored the fundamental law and order provided by the Constitution,
carried out violent subversive activities, and there remains apprehensions that
the organization may in the future carry out similar activities. The control of
organization included restriction of specific activities and dissolution of
organization.
In order to
conduct investigations needed for control of a subversive organization, Public
Security Investigation Agency has public security investigators stationed
throughout the country. The public security investigators are conferred an
investigative authority by the Subversive Activities Prevention Law. This
investigative authority has no compulsory power such as to seize evidence or to
search houses, but limited to optional basis.
By the early
1990s, with internal ultra leftists’ activities gradually fading, PSIA lost its
main role. That was the time when AUM Supreme Truth caused Tokyo Gas Attack.
PSIA, having no file and data about AUM in adbance, rushed to investigate the
cult and so, in 1995 winter, managed to be ready for applying “the
Subversive Acitivies Prevention Law”. PSIA has established a position as
authority about AUM related problems. However, because of insufficient
evidence, the Publice Security Examination Commission eventually rejected
PSIA’s appeal to disband AUM.
Under the
administrative reform since 1996, the Japanese government decided that PSIA
should be reduced in size and, in turn, a part of the staff should be allocated
to other organizations — that is, the Cabinet Intelligence Research Office and
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Those PSIA staff are to be sent to foreign
countries in order to strengthen overseas intelligence activities of
Japan.Current there are 1,700-1,800 members of PSIA, which will eventually be
decreased to at most 1,100. The other 600-700 staff will be assigned to these
other agencies.
The Second
Department of Investigation is in charge of foreign intelligence. The Division
2-2 has liaison contacts with over 30 intelligence agencies in the world,
including CIA, FBI, MI6, MOSSAD and so on. The US Central Intelligence Agency
has invited PSIA officials for training in Washington D.C., in the Intelligence
Analysis Course. An “external organization” called Kyudankai had the
function of analyzing information (and conducting espionage) on military
movements in the Soviet Union. This group reportedly had knowledge of the
impending 1980 invasion of Afghanistan, and communicated these suspicions to
the Japanese government.
