The U.S. and Climate Change : Washington’s See-Saw
on Global Leadership
President Bush flanked by other principals at the opening of the
15th G7 Summit in Paris, France on July 14, 1989. Bush’s advisors viewed
the summit as a key opportunity to position him as a leader on global
environmental issues. (Photo Credit: P04978-29 , George Bush Presidential
Library and Museum.)
Edited
by Robert A. Wampler
For more information, contact:
202-994-7000 or nsarchiv@gwu.edu
Presidents from Reagan to Obama ultimately recognized the
importance of science and high-level international cooperation in addressing
climate change
Declassified documents show pendulum swings in U.S. policy – from
climate commitment, to rejection, and back to engagement under Bush 43
Washington,
D.C., September 24, 2018 – President George H.W. Bush
initially sought a leadership role for the United States on the environment,
according to declassified documents obtained and posted today by the National
Security Archive at The George Washington University.
Contrary to the popular impression that Republican presidents have
always downplayed such concerns, the record shows that some of Bush’s advisers
– as under Ronald Reagan – early on recommended severing the “link between
economic development and deterioration of the environment,” and demonstrating
that “wise, active stewardship over the resources of our planet” was a
“responsibility we have to ourselves and as our legacy to future generations.”
The new documentation presented here provides a nuanced picture of
some of the continuities that characterized U.S. environmental policy from
Reagan to Obama, but there is clear evidence that Reagan and both Bush
presidents believed that greenhouse emissions and other problems were real and
that even senior aides to George W. Bush sought actions “grounded in science”
and designed to encourage renewed cooperation with other countries on
restricting emissions.
Though these views could not stem the early push for withdrawal
from leadership on climate change driven by Vice President Dick Cheney, similar
voices pressing for a multilateral, diplomatic solution to existing problems
later in Bush 43’s term presaged a pendulum swing back toward engagement, and
set the stage for the Obama administration to reclaim a strong leadership role.
The
GOP and Climate Change
By Robert A.
Wampler, Ph.D.
Recently declassified documents show how supporters of a climate
change treaty in the Reagan, Bush 41 and Bush 43 administrations sought to
ground U.S. climate change policy in empirical scientific research even as
these administrations gave higher priority to economic growth and energy
security. Those supporting efforts to reach an international accord to reduce
the greenhouse emissions driving global warming also faced growing criticism
that the proposed agreements did not secure participation by developing
economies, as well as growing doubts, eventually morphing into outright denial,
of the scientific evidence for climate change.
The most extreme manifestation of this opposition and denial is
now seen in the Trump administration, which announced in June 2017 that it
would withdraw from the 2016 Paris climate change treaty, and has rejected the
idea of working with traditional allies in key global institutions such as the
G7 economic summits that in the past were seen as essential forums for
contributing to climate change negotiations.[1]
The Clinton and Obama stories on climate change, including Vice
President Gore’s role, the Kyoto agreement, and negotiation of the Paris
accord, are well known, but now the expanding declassified record is revealing
interesting support for addressing climate change in the Reagan and Bush 41
administrations, as well as a pendulum swing in the Bush 43 administration away
from an initial Dick Cheney-dominated oil-and-gas-industry tilt, to more
international engagement on climate, which the Trump administration has now
ended.
The need to understand this prior history is underscored by the
recent New York Times Magazine
article entitled “Losing Earth: The Decade We Almost Stopped Climate Change,”
by Nathaniel Rich.[2]
This article provides something of a heroic narrative history relating how
scientists, government officials, NGOs and industry initially shared a concern
about the long-term impact of climate change, but squandered a supposedly
once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to build upon the Montreal protocol model to
reach agreement on the steps necessary to combat global warming as the
political and corporate (i.e., oil and gas industry) opposition to an agreement
began taking took root by the end of the Bush 41 administration.
This account is subject to criticism, ranging from overstating the
possibility of a comprehensive climate change treaty in the 1980s, to
downplaying the critical role played by corporate opposition (which the article
does discuss) and ending the story with the Bush 41 White House, which
discounts the subsequent complex history of U.S. climate change diplomacy under
Clinton, George W. Bush and Barak Obama.[3]
The story of the Republican retreat from its early leadership on
climate change must be seen in the context of this long history, which is
marked by a pronounced pendulum swing in U.S. policy between leadership and
disengagement on the issue since the 1980s. The Reagan and George H.W. Bush
administrations marked the high water mark of Republican support for efforts to
draft international agreements to address climate change, primarily through
support for the Montreal Protocol to protect the ozone layer and establishment
of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its scientific
advisory body, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).[4]
As discussed below, the Reagan and Bush 41 administrations’
approach to the proposed climate change negotiations sought to integrate and
balance scientific research with assessments of the potential economic impacts
of both climate change and steps to reduce greenhouse emissions, but was also
marked by early signs of doubts about aspects of the scientific consensus on
the topic. Under Clinton, the pendulum swung towards strong leadership, spurred
by Vice President Al Gore’s personal advocacy, which resulted in the 1997 Kyoto
Protocol.
This success was curtailed by the mounting opposition in Congress,
based primarily on non-participation by China and India and the perceived
resulting disproportionate economic and financial burden on the U.S. of meeting
the target, concerns that were shared by Clinton’s Treasury department. [5]
As discussed below, the George W. Bush administration saw the pendulum swing
back to disengagement and broad criticism of the Kyoto Protocol, as Bush pulled
the U.S, out of the agreement and gave overriding priority to economic
interests, primarily energy, a position driven by Vice President Richard
Cheney. By the end of the Bush 43 administration, the U.S. began moving back
towards working with its allies on climate change.
This shift became a guiding policy under Obama, as the pendulum
swung back yet again to renewed leadership in the talks leading to the Paris
climate change treaty in 2016, but an even more radical swing back to
opposition and climate change denial arrived with Trump’s election to the
presidency.
A further discussion of the historical context for the documents
posted today is helpful. As noted above, the Reagan administration played a key
leadership role in fighting domestic opposition to the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and in securing international agreement
to the protocol. The documents posted here show the continued efforts by the
administration to secure early and wide implementation of the protocol and its
role in establishing the UN-based work on a climate change framework
convention. The U.S. emphasized the key findings of scientific research as
underscoring the urgent need for action to protect the ozone layer (see
Documents 1, 2 and 4). Noting a concern that would only grow when work began on
a climate change treaty, the administration warned that developing economies
such as China and India must participate in the protocol, and not become
“pollution havens.” (see Documents 1 and 3) The administration also saw the
Montreal agreement as a model for efforts under the aegis of the UN
Environmental Program (UNEP) to draft a UN framework convention on climate
change that would guide negotiations on a treaty.
A key State Department official under Reagan and Bush 41 in these
talks was William A. Nitze (son of Paul Nitze), the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for Environment, Health and Natural Resources. Nitze presented the
U.S. position at the initial UNEP special session in March 1988 that began
developing plans to coordinate U.N. agencies, governments, NGOs and publics
within medium-term plans through 1995 on a wide range of issues including
climate change (Document 5). Here Nitze said the U.S. would continue to take a
leadership role, but before considering a global convention on climate change,
more must be learned about the global and regional impacts of climate change
and the full range of possible responses.
To this end, the U.S. strongly supported creation of an
intergovernmental panel (what would become the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change, or IPCC, created later in 1988) to conduct and assess
scientific research into the extent and effects of global climate change, and
to begin development of a range of possible response strategies. However, U.S.
support came with an important proviso that would only grow more prominent in
Republican administrations: “Whatever response strategies are finally adopted
will have to take into account other social and economic goals.”
President George H.W. Bush early on in his presidency sought to
position himself as a leader on global environmental issues. This is seen in
the memorandum laying out the proposed U.S. position at the Paris economic
summit in July 1988, when he was still vice president (Document 6). Noting that
while British, French and Canadian leaders had staked out strong environmental
positions, the U.S. had so far “remained silent.” To remedy this, an
interagency group recommended that President Bush present a program at the
summit designed to break “the link between economic development and
deterioration of the environment,” and informed by the theme of “wise, active
stewardship over the resources of our planet. This is a responsibility we have
to ourselves and as our legacy to future generations.”
The memorandum outlines a set of initiatives to tackle global
warming, as well as to combat environmental pollution. To address global
warming, the interagency group recommended three proposals: steps to address
deforestation and reforestation; increasing fossil fuel efficiency and expanding
renewable energy; and support for nuclear energy (an idea likely to elicit
strong opposition from environmentalists) both for energy security and to
contribute to solving the greenhouse emissions problem.
The Bush 41 administration also continued to push for its approach
in the U.N. discussions surrounding what would become the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which was agreed to at the 1992 Rio de
Janeiro Earth Summit. William Nitze remained closely involved with this
diplomacy. A memorandum he prepared in Summer 1989 laid out the general
principles that should guide a climate agreement (Document 7). These included
securing the widest possible participation, with a focus on the countries that
made up a significant majority of the world’s population and those that
produced the highest percentage of greenhouse gases; increasing understanding
of the scientific aspects of global climate change, and protecting social,
environmental and economic well-being from damaging impacts likely to result
from climate change.
While the U.S. continued to emphasize the importance of scientific
research and analysis, its positions in the UN discussions continued to reflect
the need to balance environmental protection and economic growth. This is seen
in a memorandum setting out the policy guidelines for U.S. participants in a UN
Response Strategies Working Group in Fall 1989 (Document 8). This memo
describes what would become repeated components of U.S. policy preferences,
including emphasizing the use of market mechanisms in combination with
regulations to reduce greenhouse emissions, and giving countries the widest
possible flexibility in meeting any agreed emission cuts.
There were also signs of concern over the conclusions being
reached by the IPCC in its initial reports. As an Energy Department memorandum
(Document 9) points out, the initial full Working Group I report on the science
of climate change was acceptable, but it was felt the summary reports made “too
strong a case for global warming and [did] not adequately represent the
scientific uncertainties.” Again, this focus on “scientific uncertainties”
would come to mark the right-wing criticisms of any attempts to address climate
change.
With the election of Bill Clinton in 1992, U.S. climate change
diplomacy moved into a new stage. The culmination of this diplomacy was the
1997 Kyoto Protocol. Though championed by Clinton and especially by Vice
President, Al Gore, in the end the administration did not submit the agreement
to Congress for ratification, recognizing this would not be forthcoming in the
face of political criticism of the accord, most prominently for not imposing
greenhouse emission reduction targets on developing economies such as China and
India.
The next stage in U.S. climate change diplomacy would take place
under the leadership of the George W. Bush White House, which brought a much
more skeptical approach to efforts to tackle global climate change, driven both
by the developing nations issue and by the overriding emphasis on U.S. energy
security pressed by Vice President Richard Cheney’s Energy Task Force.
Several of the documents posted today date from the early months
of the Bush 43 presidency, when some high-level advisors, notably Treasury
Secretary Paul O’Neill and EPA Administrator Christine Todd Whitman, believed
that President Bush was open to a review of U.S. climate change policy that
would seek to improve upon the Kyoto agreement. They had been encouraged in
this by Bush’s campaign statements that he would impose controls on CO2
emissions.[6]
Documents 10-14 shed light on early discussions within the Bush
administration about how it would address climate change and the U.S. adherence
to the Kyoto Protocol. There is a clear concern displayed in these documents
over how to address the question of economic costs associated with any
imposition of greenhouse emission reductions, specifically CO2, and
considerable thought is given to how market mechanisms could provide incentives
for such reductions without serious harm to economic growth.
How to secure participation by developing countries was also a
major concern, linked to potential costs and the domestic political criticisms
that the Kyoto Protocol did not include reduction targets for these nations.
Secretary O’Neill’s recommendations to President Bush (Document 12) stress the need
to carry out a rigorous empirical assessment of climate change policy options
guided by scientific expertise, which would then serve as the basis for
engaging other governments “in a re-consideration and replacement of the treaty
with a plan that is grounded in science and aimed at reducing concentrations
rather than emissions.”
All of these efforts would prove fruitless in the face of Vice
President Cheney’s forceful push to give energy security overriding priority
over what were portrayed as possible global climate changes based on so-called
“bad science.” With its announcement in late March 2001 that the U.S. intended
to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol, the Bush administration completed a
retreat from global leadership on climate change. As Document 15 notes, the
U.S. focused on pushing its views on climate change at meetings of the UNFCC
Conference of Parties, while withholding funds for any Kyoto Protocol-related
costs.
There were signs of reengagement in the last two years of the Bush
43 presidency, as the administration launched a new initiative called the Major
Economies Process that worked to bring together the major greenhouse emitters
and energy consumers to work in tandem with the UNFCCC on drafting a new
post-2012 framework agreement on climate change (see Document 16).
The incoming Obama administration would launch a similar
initiative in 2009, called the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate
Change, to foster dialogue between developed and developing countries on
working within the UN UNFCC on a new climate change treaty, and on promoting
adoption of clean energy technologies and other steps to reduce greenhouse
emissions. Forum meetings took place through 2015 and arguably played a role in
the successful negotiation of the December 2016 Paris Climate Change Treaty.[7]
The period of renewed U.S. leadership on climate change under Obama
came to a sudden halt with the election of Donald Trump as president in 2016
and his subsequent announcement on June 1, 2017, that the U.S. would withdraw
from the Paris climate change treaty. The reasons advanced were among the most
extreme positions regarding the science of climate change and the potential
economic impact of imposing reductions on greenhouse emissions since opposition
emerged to the Kyoto Protocol two decades earlier.
In a curious mirroring of the debate within the early Bush 43
White House, it was reported that among Trump’s advisers, there was a division
of opinion on the merits of staying in or abandoning the treaty. Energy
Secretary Rick Perry, then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, and adviser and
son-in-law Jared Kushner, among others, reportedly wanted the U.S. to remain
committed to the agreement, while White House adviser Steve Bannon and then-EPA
Administrator Scott Pruitt pushed to abandon it. Under the terms of the treaty
the U.S. cannot fully withdraw until 2020, but the impact on U.S. global
leadership was immediate, as European leaders such as German Chancellor Angela
Merkel openly voiced their disapproval of Trump’s actions. The step also held
near-term impacts as the administration further announced it would not implement
the carbon reduction targets set by President Obama.[8]
1987-10-14
Source: Department of State FOIA
As noted above,
the Reagan administration played a crucial leadership role in securing
agreement to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.
This cable reflects the administration’s commitment to begin taking steps to
limit emissions as soon as possible, stressing that, “The broadest
possible participation in the protocol is important to its effectiveness –
because of the long atmospheric lifetime of the chemicals, emissions anywhere
affect the ozone layer over the entire globe and over many decades. ” The
urgency to act was underscored by recently released preliminary findings of a
study of springtime depletion of ozone over the Arctic. The continued reduction
in ozone identified by this study “strongly suggests that both chemical
and meteorological mechanisms perturbed the ozone.” The U.S. also believed
it was important to secure the widest possible adherence to the Montreal
Protocol, especially with regard to developing countries, stressing that with
regard to China, India and newly-industrializing nations, “It is essential
to the protocol’s effectiveness that countries with significant potential
future production/use sign and ratify.” To this end, the cable includes
specific instructions to embassies in these countries for urging them to join
the agreement.
1987-12-10
Source: Department of State FOIA
This cable
reports on steps being taken by the U.S. to implement the Montreal Protocol,
including the EPA issuing proposed regulations and President Reagan plans to
submit the agreement to the Senate in December 1987. It also instructs the
embassies to make sure their respective countries are aware of the new
Antarctic ozone finds, as noted in the previous cable, noting that “the
preliminary Antarctic findings indicat[e] that the loss of ozone was greater
than ever previously recorded. While the scientists are still analyzing their
data, we believe the preliminary findings confirm the wisdom of the Montreal
Protocol.” The cable also noted that “On November 3, the Senate passed
a resolution calling for steps toward ratification to be taken as quickly as
possible. The resolution reflects broad support for the protocol and additional
concern raised by recent Senate hearings on the preliminary results from the
Antarctic.”
1988-01-30
Source: Department of State FOIA
This cable
addresses the concern, noted in document 1, that India and China adhere to the
Montreal Protocol, as part of the essential effort to have the broadest
possible participation in the agreement. The concern is that otherwise both
countries could potentially become major producers of ozone-depleting
chemicals, a concern stressed by a recent report by the congressional Office of
Technology Assessment and that will likely be pressed during Senate hearings on
the agreement. Among the talking points for the embassies to use in pressing
this issue with India and China are “The atmospheric science and
environmental effects: The risks are real and substantial;” and
“International standing: other major countries are participating; the
Chinese and Indians should not want to be seen as potential “pollution
havens.”
1988-03-15
Source: Department of State FOIA
This cable
provides greater detail on the newest scientific findings regarding ozone
depletion, which further buttress the need for quick implementation of the
Montreal Protocol. The report of the Ozone Trends Panel, established in October
1986 by NASA, NOAA, the UNEP and other agencies to reassess ground and
satellite data to see if this supported the findings of two 1985 reports that
found significant reduction in atmospheric ozone. A key finding of the panel’s
report, released on March 15, 1988, was that “There is undisputed
observational evidence that the atmospheric concentrations of gases important
in controlling stratospheric ozone levels continue to increase on a global
scale because of human activities.” These findings confirmed the prediction
of models and in some cases exceeded the decrease in ozone that they predicted,
and show that “man-made chlorine species are primarily responsible”
for the decreases in ozone.
1988-03-22
Source: Department of State FOIA
This cable
contains the statements made by the U.S. head of delegation, William A. Nitze,
the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Environment, Health and Natural Resources in
the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, to
the first special session of the governing council of the United Nations Environment
Program (UNEP), held in Nairobi. The meeting was convened to consider three
forward planning documents designed to coordinate the UN system of agencies,
governments, non-governmental organizations and publics around the world with
respect to a System-Wide Medium-Term Environment Program (SWMTEP) for the
period 1990-1995; a UNEP Medium-term plan for the period 1990-1995; and
extension of the 1984-1989 UN medium-term plan through 1990 and 1991. The range
of issues covered by these plans was ambitious: stratospheric ozone depletion,
destruction of tropical forests and the biological diversity they support,
global climate change, air and water pollution, and international shipments of
hazardous wastes.
Nitze confirmed the U.S. intention to play a leading role in framing and
implementing the overall goals of these plans, and aligning U.S. environmental
priorities with these goals:
“With respect to global climate change, the U.S. will continue to take a
leadership role in implementing the Montreal Protocol on ozone depleting
substances. Before considering development of an international convention on
the overall climate change issue, however, we must learn much more about the
global and regional impacts of climate change and the full range of possible
response strategies to deal with those impacts. The U.S. strongly supports
creation of an intergovernmental panel reporting jointly to UNEP and WMO which
would simultaneously (1) stimulate and assess scientific research into the
extent, distribution and effects of global climate change and (2) begin to
develop a range of possible response strategies to deal with those
effects.”
This support came with an important proviso: “Whatever response strategies
are finally adopted will have to take into account other social and economic
goals.” This hedging would only grow stronger in the future for the two
Bush administrations. Furthermore: The UNEP was “not in a position to
enact or enforce environmental laws, regulations or policies. This must be done
by the individual countries concerned. UNEP’s proper role is to facilitate the
development and implementation of such laws, regulations and procedures by
individual countries and to assist those countries in establishing the
institutional and legal mechanisms necessary for their effective
implementation.”
Briefing Memorandum re
environmental issues at the Economic Summit, ca. July 1989 [C]
1989-07-00
Source: Department of State FOIA
This memorandum
lays out proposed U.S. positions on global environmental issues that would
establish President Bush as a leader on these topics at the Economic Summit to
be held July 13-17, 1989 in Paris. This is seen as very important, as British
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, French President Francois Mitterrand and Canadian
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney had already staked out strong environmental
positions, while the U.S. has so far “remained silent.” Working in
response to a charge from the White House Summit Group, the State Department
created a group composed of representatives from State, EPA, Energy, Commerce,
and other federal agencies that developed a program that aimed at
“breaking the link between economic development and deterioration of the
environment.” The memorandum recommends that President Bush stress the theme
that runs through these proposals of “wise, active stewardship over the
resources of our planet. This is a responsibility we have to ourselves and as
our legacy to future generations.”
The first set of proposals outlines three initiatives to combat environmental
pollution, focusing on industrial pollution prevention, prevention and clean-up
of oil spills, and the state of the world’s oceans. The second set focuses on
global warming. The three initiatives discussed here stress studying the most
cost-effective ways to slow warming in the future. They are 1) steps to address
deforestation and reforestation; 2) increasing fossil fuel efficiency and
expanding renewable energy; and 3) support for nuclear energy both for energy
security and to contribute to solving the greenhouse problem. The memorandum
acknowledged that the last initiative would likely be unpopular with
environmentalists. All the proposals are discussed at length in the memorandum,
along with the pros and cons for each. The proposals were seen as having only
modest budgetary implications for the U.S., though in some cases would call for
action by international bodies to whom the U.S. was in arrears regarding its
financial support, which could be “embarrassing.”
1989-08-15
Source: Department of State FOIA
This memorandum
was prepared as part of the U.S. participation in the IPCC Response Strategies
Working Group (RSWG), which was established to “examine existing legal and
institutional mechanisms to determine how they may be used to implement options
to limit or adapt to climate change” and “consider new legal and
institutional mechanisms that could be used to implement options to limit or
adapt to climate change.” The bulk of the memorandum is taken up with a
list of relevant existing legal and institutional mechanism, while the last part
examines possible elements of a framework climate convention. It is this last
part (pages 18-21) that is of the most interest as a window into developing
U.S. ideas for a climate change treaty, as seen from the State Department.
Looking first at the general principles that should guide a climate agreement,
first was the need for the widest possible participation, with emphasis on
those nations that make up a significant majority of the world’s population and
those that produce the greatest percentage of greenhouse gases. The framework
convention should follow the model of the 1985 Vienna Convention for the
Protection of the Ozone Layer and provide an institutional framework for
ongoing assessment of global climate change and possible responses. Its twin
goals should “be to provide a framework for: 1) increasing our
understanding of the scientific aspects of global climate change and its
potential impacts; and 2) protecting social, environmental, and economic
well-being from adverse impacts likely to result from climate change.”
Finally, the agreement should provide for involving and assisting developing
nations address climate change.
The Vienna convention was a good model, as it established broad principles of
cooperation, not specific and likely contentious provisions dealing with areas
such as liability, financial measures or enforcement, and established an
institutional structure through which the participants can discuss specific
future steps in light of ongoing scientific research. One interesting emphasis
is on how the framework goals should not be defined. It should not be
“protecting the climate,” as some had put it. “Protecting the
climate per se is not our objective; rather, our objective is to protect
social, environmental, and economic well-being from the adverse effects likely
to result from global climate change.” Instead, the “framework
convention should implement its twin goals by generally adopting the conceptual
approach taken by the IPCC. Thus, the convention should focus on cooperation in
1) assessing the relevant scientific information related to global climate
change; 2) assessing potential impacts of global climate change and their
likelihoods; and 3) formulating and evaluating appropriate response measures,
on the basis of such assessments as well as social, economic, and environmental
factors and cost effectiveness.”
The memorandum underscores the significant importance of ongoing scientific
assessment to the success of any framework agreement. This process should be
augmented by increased cooperation and coordination, supported by the
agreement, in research and climate monitoring “to improve knowledge about
the origins, mechanisms, and effects of global climate change.” This work
should also be the focus of expert panels created by the framework convention
“to collect, analyze, and report to the parties on relevant scientific,
technical, environmental, social and economic information…,” so that his
information can be used to develop future response protocols. Financial
measures to support these responses would likewise be the subject of future
discussion and agreement. Finally, with respect to the participation of
developing countries, the framework should provide for cooperation in the
development and transfer of technologies to limit or adapt to climate change.
1989-09-28
Source: Department of State FOIA
This memorandum
lays out the positions the U.S. participants should take in the upcoming
October 2-6, 1989 meeting of the UN Response Strategies Working Group, where
the agreed report was to be produced. The U.S. had submitted papers, produced
by a “lengthy” interagency process, on the five main topics to be
covered by the report: legal and institutional measures; technology assistance,
development and transfer; financial measures; economic measures; and education
and information measures.
Anticipating other governments will be pressing views different from the U.S.
this memorandum provided the common policy guidelines the U.S participants
should follow in the discussions. Also important would be keeping in mind
President Bush’s desire “to lead the efforts of the international
community to protect and enhance the quality of the global environment while
maintaining acceptable economic growth.” Therefore, the U.S. positions
should be presented positively in terms of ultimately contributing to the
“decisive action . . . to understand and protect the earth’s ecological
balance’ called for by the President and other leaders” at the recent
Paris Economic Summit.
The section of the memorandum dealing with legal and institutional measures
closely follows the U.S. paper on this topic, which includes the scope and
goals of a climate framework agreement (see Document 8). The section on
technology also repeated the points made in the other document about providing
for cooperation in the development and transfer of technologies need to address
climate change, with due protection for intellectual property rights and
maximum use of existing governmental and non-governmental institutions and
mechanisms.
Likewise, the report’s discussion of financial measures should describe
existing bilateral and multilateral financial assistance mechanisms and
encourage their use. The report should not recommend specific financial
measures such as global climate funds, but should call for creation of a
working group under the proposed convention to study possible mechanisms to
assist LDC’s in responding to “anthropogenically induced global climate
change.”
Regarding economic measures, the report should emphasize the importance of
using market mechanisms, including price signals, in combination with
regulations and product standards to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and
should note the advantage of giving the greatest possible flexibility to find
the most economically efficient way to reduce these emissions.
Finally, with respect to education and information steps, the report should
stress “the need to present the science of climate change and its impacts
on natural resources and socioeconomic conditions in a balanced and objective
way which reflects all of the areas of agreement and the uncertainties.”
Finding this balance would be increasingly difficult not just for Republican
but also Democratic administrations.
1990-06-07
Source: Department of Energy FOIA
This memorandum
to the Secretary of Energy flags issues that DOE saw in the Executive Summary
and Policymaker’s Summary of the initial report by Working Group I, which
focused on the science of climate change, of the International Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC). The IPCC was formed in October 1988 by the UN Environmental
Program and the World Meteorological Organization to prepare, in addition to
the report on science, reports on the socioeconomic impacts of climate change
and possible strategies to mitigate these impacts. These reports were to be
presented at the Second World Climate Conference in October 1990 and to the
United Nations General Assembly in November 1990. The U.S. participation in
drafting the Working Group I reports had been headed by members of the Working
Group on Global Change of the Committee on Earth and Environmental Sciences
(CEES), which was part of the U.S. Global Change Research Program.[9]
The draft reports had been reviewed by the CEES and the National Academy of
Sciences. There were few concerns regarding the full Working Group I report,
which is described as providing a “a reasonable picture of the current
scientific consensus on climate change and also addresses some recommended
approaches to narrowing the scientific uncertainties.” However, there were
concerns whether the two summary reports accurately reflected the findings of
the full report (the Executive Summary is attached). These, it was felt,
“make too strong a case for global warming and do not adequately represent
the scientific uncertainties.” Specific revisions to the executive summary
itemized in the memorandum provide evidence of how the summary should be changed,
mostly by making statements more conditional with respect to what the science
says about the causes and likely future course of global warming. Given the
“political realities” of the European governments whose views
dominate the summaries, this was not unexpected, but looking forward, the
memorandum recommends that the Energy secretary stress the full report and work
to deemphasize the two summaries.
2001-02-20
Source: Department of Treasury FOIA
This memorandum
discusses issues expected to be raised at an interagency meeting on the new
administration’s climate change policy, with a particular focus on economic
aspects of climate change mitigation . Ron Suskind provides a summary of the
meeting in his book on Secretary O’Neill and the Bush White House.[10]
The bulk of this document is a set of PowerPoint slides that address key
economic and financial costs associated with pricing carbon emissions, cap and
trade vs. carbon tax schemes, past and projected U.S. emissions, estimated
compliance costs for the U.S. in accepting the Kyoto commitments, and the
impact of flexibility provisions and the use of carbon sinks to offset costs.
The major points are itemized in the attached Tab B, “Economics of Climate
Change Mitigation.” These include:
- The key policy is to put a price on
carbon-equivalent emissions, so that economic activity incorporates the
environmental cost of greenhouse gas emissions. - The US has a very ambitious target under
Kyoto, but so do others. - Emissions reductions are much more
costly if they must be done quickly, requiring premature scrapping of
capital. - Developing country participation can
greatly lower our costs and benefit them. Nonetheless most are opposed on
principle to taking even modest, growth targets. - Options for major changes from Kyoto, in
particular more modest targets and a cost cap, could greatly lower costs.
2001-02-21
Source: Department of State FOIA
This PowerPoint
presentation, prepared by the State Department for Treasury Secretary O’Neill,
also dates from the period when O’Neill, along with EPA Administrator Whitman,
thought the new Bush administration was going to carry out a reasoned,
fact-based assessment of its position on global warming and the next steps to
negotiate a climate change treaty based on the Kyoto protocol. It likely
parallels the State Department’s presentations made at the inter-agency meeting
held the previous day (see document 10).
The presentation outlines four possible courses of action for the U.S.: stay
the course; toughen positions; seek major changes in the Kyoto agreement; or
abandon the negotiations, with the strategy, goals, assumptions and prospects
for success in terms of domestic and international acceptance of each course
identified. The one salient point that emerges is that domestic and
international acceptance tended to be diametrically opposed; for example,
staying the course to make Kyoto work as negotiated would likely have low
chances of ratification in the U.S. but would be popular overseas, while
seeking major changes in the proposed treaty would play well domestically with
some audiences (the opposition to Kyoto was largely Republican, but there were
Democratic critics of the treaty, as seen when the Clinton administration
decided not to submit the treaty to Congress for ratification) but fare less
well internationally in the near term, though this may change over time. In the
event, it would be the last option, abandoning the effort to implement Kyoto,
that Bush would take, largely guided by Cheney’s push to place energy security
ahead of environmental concerns.
The presentation acknowledged there were criticisms of Kyoto and a number of
contentious issues to be resolved before any post-Kyoto agreement could be
reached. The recent COP-6 meeting at the Hague in December 2000 had ended
stalemated on efforts to reach agreement on key outstanding issues, such as how
market mechanisms would work to curb emissions, how to include forests and
farmlands, and securing participation by developing countries, a particular
U.S. concern, and the push by these countries for significant financial and
technological assistance. In the U.S., some felt a legally binding target for
reducing emissions was a bad idea: there were uncertainties regarding the
potential cost of the proposed mechanisms for such reductions, and
non-participation by developing countries could harm U.S. competitiveness.
The scorecard was mixed regarding the current situation in terms of U.S., EU
and developing country objectives for the negotiations. The UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol did reflect the U.S. goals
of establishing an overall framework for the negotiations and seeking
non-binding targets for reducing emissions to 1990 levels by 2000 through the
use of market mechanisms such as emission trading, and potential credits for supporting
emission reduction projects in developing countries and for “carbon
sinks” such as forests and farmlands. These were seen as key to the U.S.
goal of incorporating flexibility into the means by which nations could work
towards their emission reduction goals, and to avoiding undue economic costs.
This success was counterbalanced by the EU focus on top-down regulation and
limited flexibility in how nations could seek to meet their emission goals, and
the rejection by developing countries of emission targets, combined with their
stress on financial and technological aid in addressing global warming.
Finally, the U.S. had to address the view that it was a “profligate”
consumer, representing about 20% of the world’s greenhouse emissions, with per
capita emissions 3-4 times that of the EU and 8 times that of China. Moving
forward, the U.S. could expect to encounter international resistance to any new
approach. To overcome opposition, the U.S. would need to establish a clear
standard for U.S. ratification, if sought, and strong domestic action.
2001-02-27
Source: Department of Treasury FOIA
This memorandum
was first published in the updated edition of Ron Suskind’s book on Treasury
Secretary O’Neill, The Price of Loyalty,
and is included here as the document is no longer available on the book’s
website.[11]
In Addition to President Bush, copies also went to Vice President Cheney,
Christine Whitman at EPA, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary of State
Powell, and other cabinet-level officials with a stake in the issue. In it,
O’Neill lays out a way for President Bush to ground the policy debate over
climate change on expert opinion to more clearly determine existing and
potential greenhouse emissions and concentrations, their sources, and options
to reduce these over time. O’Neill acknowledges the problems with the Kyoto
agreement: if fully implemented, it would only delay the projected accumulation
of greenhouse gases by 11 years, a trivial step against what ONeill saw as a
“very big problem;” it would, however, result in cutting projected
U.S. energy consumption by over 30% in the 2008-2012 time period. The limited
results and significant impact on the U.S. were the result of not including
developing countries in the emission targets. O’Neill wrote that environmental
groups recognized the limited impact of Kyoto, but supported it as a first
step, a means of getting “the nose under the tent.”
To place the Bush administration on a more productive path, O’Neill proposed
that Bush first arrange to be briefed by a group of experts on the substance of
the issue and the history of U.S. policy in developing a climate change treaty.
This briefing would be publicized to demonstrate the administration’s reasoned
approach to crafting its climate treaty policy. After this briefing, Bush
should establish a group of experts to prepare a public document that spells
out the established scientific facts regarding greenhouse gas emissions, their
projected concentrations, how these affect climate change, and key assumptions
behind these linkages. These experts would then develop a process for
establishing a consensus on the targeted limits on greenhouse gas
concentrations, along with catalogues of the sources of these emissions and
possible steps to reduce them, including assessment of economic costs and
likelihood of success. Th1s would serve as the basis for analyzing the
available options for amending or replacing the Kyoto agreement, and
recommendations on how best to engage other governments “in a
re-consideration and replacement of the treaty with a plan that is grounded in
science and aimed at reducing concentrations rather than emissions. “
This work would provide the basis for the Bush White House to formulate its
climate change policy. O’Neill felt this could be done in time for the next
post-Kyoto climate change conference in the coming summer. Given the
cross-agency nature of the policy, he suggested that Bush consider rolling the
work on the climate change policy into Vice President Cheney’s existing energy
task force. O’Neill also suggested people outside government who could helpful
in the process, including former secretary of state George Shultz, and
environmental scientists Michael Oppenheimer of the Environmental Defense Fund
and Jared Cohen, president of Carnegie Mellon University.
2001-03-06
Source: Department of Treasury FOIA
This memorandum
preparing Secretary O’Neill for a meeting with White House advisor Gary Edson,
who served on both the NSC and the National Economic Council, still reflects
O;Neill’s efforts to shape President Bush’s views on climate change policy. The
section on climate change, prepared by the Treasury Department’s Office of
Economic Policy, offers observations on O’Neill’s statements at the February 21
interagency meeting (see documents 10 and 11) and his memorandum to Bush
(document 12).
With respect to O’Neill’s statement that the current Kyoto emission targets
would result in only a brief delay in greenhouse gas concentrations, the
memorandum notes that the parties to the negotiations have assumed that each
consecutive commitment period would bring into force new and likely more
stringent targets, as well as the eventual inclusion of binding commitments by
developing countries. Seen in this light, the impact of the evolving Kyoto
targets was not necessarily the only, or even the most plausible, outcome of
the current agreement.
With respect to O’Neill’s observation to Bush in his memorandum that some see
the Kyoto protocol as a way to get “the nose under the tent” as the
basis for further talks, the memorandum says that most economists working on
climate change mitigation agree that, while the Kyoto targets and timetables
are infeasible, a good mitigation approach would be “to establish a modest
carbon price signal and increase it gradually and predictably. ” This
would allow the economy to adjust and adopt practices that involve less
greenhouse gas-intensive production and consumption. This adjustment could, in
theory, be “accomplished with a series of commitment periods with
reasonable but decreasing targets (perhaps in combination with a safety valve)
as the basic Protocol structure envisages, or with approaches such as gradually
increased harmonized taxes.” A key problem in implementing the Kyoto
Protocol is that the short run price elasticity of such substitutions is very
low, making an ambitious first period target very expensive.
Finally, with respect to the projected impact on the U.S. of fully meeting the
Kyoto targets, if the flexibility in means of response pushed by the U.S. is
included, it would not necessarily mean that the U.S. needed to reduce its
emissions or energy consumption by more than 30% by the 2008-2012 period.
Models predicted that over half of the emission cuts the U.S. would have to
make under Kyoto could be secured by importing emission allowances, i.e.,
receiving credit for supporting emission reductions in other countries.
Another part of this memorandum, dealing with the Global Environment Facility
(GEF) discusses how U.S. support for this agency was encountering funding
issues with Congress because politicians were linking the GEF and the Kyoto
Protocol. The GEF was created on a pilot basis in 1991 to help finance
investment in developing countries that produce environmental benefits, with
one focus is addressing climate change through support of energy sufficiency
and renewable energy projects. The GEF was facing a major budget crisis, due in
part to the fact that U.S. payments in support of the facility were in serious
arrears. This arrears problem was linked to the misperception in Congress that
the GEF was financing “back door” implementation of the Kyoto
Protocol. Treasury had worked hard to prevent any linkage between the GEF and
Kyoto, but recent positions taken by the State Department in the climate change
talks, where proposals were discussed to have the GEF manage funds created out
of certain Kyoto protocol mechanisms (a tradable emissions fund and a Clean
Development Mechanism). was complicating this effort.
2001-03-11
Source: Department of Treasury FOIA
This memorandum
to Jeffrey Kupfer, Treasury Secretary O’Neill’s deputy chief of staff, looks at
questions surrounding efforts to curb carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions
as part of a comprehensive climate change agreement as discussed in draft
climate change memoranda reviewed by Adele Morris of Treasury’s Office of
Economic Policy. The memorandum’s brief summary of the science is that the risk
of climate change was real, based on the science, so the administration could
anticipate continued domestic and international pressure to take it seriously.
The assessment of policy options was carried out in the context of a Department
of Energy study that evaluated very stringent caps on carbon dioxide; i.e.,
1990 levels of utility emissions by 2005 or 2008 and 7% below that by 2008 to
2012. The DOE study made the seemingly common sense observation that either
adopting less stringent limits or extending the time frame for implementing
them could work to reduce the overall costs of compliance.
Evaluating the options in light of the growing conclusiveness of science about
climate change, Morris argued there was no need to adopt either of two
extremes: it was inadvisable to deny the idea of eventual mandatory reductions
in greenhouse gasses, while there was no environmental or economic reason to
immediately initiate “costly and severe” cuts in CO2 emissions
by power plants. Furthermore, a commitment to reduce greenhouse emissions did
not necessarily result in a policy to control CO2 using the utilities-based
emissions approach found in recent legislation. Other options needed to be
analyzed, in particular a broader climate effort that could be more efficient
than a sector-based approach, given that electric utilities represent only 30%
of U.S. greenhouse emissions. The memorandum proceeds to provide a detailed
discussion of the merits of developing price incentives for fossil-fuel
producers to curb emissions, arguing that a “modest, predictable and broad
price signal would produce the greatest reductions in greenhouse gas emissions
for the least cost to the economy.” Also, regulating CO2
emissions as part of an overall clean air policy could reduce costs and
regulatory uncertainty for utilities compared to regulating conventional
pollutants first and then unexpectedly limiting CO2 later. Also key
will be how a cap and trade system for utilities would operate.
While most of the conclusions and recommendations are redacted, what is
released indicates openness to regulating CO2 as part of an
innovative strategy. On the other hand, carbon dioxide was a compound on which
life depends. The overall balance that was being sought was summed up in the
view attributed to President Bush: “The President recognizes the value of
reducing the regulatory uncertainty that makes long term planning difficult,
but he believes that it is appropriate to take the time to develop the right
approach to the complex issues raised by global climate change.”
2004-01-07
Source: Department of State FOIA
This PowerPoint
presentation provides the Bush administration’s take on the discussion and
outcomes of the recent climate change conference held in Milan, Italy in early
December 2003. The presentation was given by Dr. Harlan Watson, the State
Department’s Special Representative and U.S. senior climate negotiator, to
representatives from the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM). As the
largest manufacturing association in the United States, NAM was a powerful body
with deep vested interests in the economic and financial implications of any
climate change treaty.
The December 2003 Milan meetings included the ninth session of the Conference
of Parties (COP) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change as well as sessions
of two subsidiary bodies, for Implantation (SB 19) and for Scientific and
Technological Advice (SBSTA).[12]
The ministerial sessions of the COP involved roundtable discussions on climate
change, adaptation, mitigation and sustainable development; applications of
technology to address climate change; and assessment of progress to date at all
levels in fulfilling the goals embodied in the climate change agreements. The
Milan COP was seen as a “breather” before tackling the difficult task
of negotiating a post-Kyoto treaty, with the discussions focused in many cases
on building confidence among the parties. The U.S. delegation’s priority was
making clear the Bush administration’s policy on climate change.
Most of U.S. interest and concern was focused on financial issues discussed at
the meetings. First was the matter of the biennium budget for 2004-2005. Here,
the U.S. secured a clear distinction between UNFCC and Kyoto costs, and the
clear understanding that it would only contribute to the former; the U.S. would
also withhold funds for any Kyoto elements of the convention’s “core”
budget and would no contribute to any other Kyoto costs. The U.S. also helped
to identify Kyoto’s costs at over $17.5 million in 2004-2005, and worked with
Japan to fight against any increase in the convention’s “core”
budget, which in the end was agreed to increase by 6% over the previous
biennium (against the 29% increase requested by the UNFCC secretariat and the
9% sought by the EU). The U.S. also will indicated it would not contribute to
the Special Climate Change and Least Developed Country funds, as they are part of
a Kyoto package in which it does not participate.
The U.S also pressed its views on scientific and technological issues taken up
by the SBSTA. In discussions on the IPCC’s Third Annual Review (TAR), the EU
sought to set broad agendas, including discussions about atmospheric
concentrations of greenhouse gasses and national burden-sharing, while the U.S.
and other nations, including Japan and Australia, pressed for a focus on
“bottom-up” discussion of practical opportunities and solutions to climate
change. In the end, the SBSTA opted for the more practical approach, which the
U.S. believes will produce a more useful exchange of information among experts
and parties to the convention.
2008-04-01
Source: Department of State FOIA
This cable
reports on a “frank” exchange between U.S. and European Union
officials about addressing climate change under the related frameworks of the
UN FCCC and the U.S.-initiated Major Economies Process (MEP). The latter was
launched by President Bush in May 2007 with the goal of bringing together the
major greenhouse gas emitters and energy consumers to work on drafting a new
post-2012 framework agreement on climate change by the end of 2008. The nations
involved included Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India,
Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Korea, South Africa, United
Kingdom, the and EU, as well as UN representatives. The MEP was not seen as an
alternative to the existing UN framework, but a complement to it, and stressed
the need to foster energy and economic security, along with new clean
technologies, as key elements of any climate change agreement.[13]
Representing the U.S. at this Brussels meeting were Paula Dobriansky, Under
Secretary of State for Democracy and Global Affairs, Jim Connaughton, Chairman
of the White House Council on Environmental Quality, and Dan Price, Assistant
to the President for International economic Affairs. The EU delegation was led
by Janez Podobnik, Slovenian Minister of Environment and Spatial Planning (for
the EU Presidency), Stavros Dimas, European Commissioner for the Environment
and Pierre Vimont, French Ambassador to the U.S.
The cable provides a detailed account of the often technical exchanges between
the U.S. and European officials about targeted reductions in greenhouse
emissions under a climate change framework agreement, as well as discussions of
new technologies such as biofuels and clean coal, so only a few of the key
exchanges will be summarized here. The U.S. delegation sought EU agreement
under a MEP “Leaders Declaration” to a number of points, including a
long-term global goal; legally binding, nationally determined mid-term (i.e.,
sometime between 2020 and 2030) goals backed by national plans; and financing
mechanisms, but the EU environmental commissioner was noncommittal, saying each
proposal would have to be evaluated individually.
With respect to the UNFCCC discussions, CEQ chairman Conaughton said that the
U.S needs binding commitments from other nations, including developing
countries, to secure congressional assent to an international agreement on
greenhouse gas emissions, and urged a commitment to this goal at the upcoming
MEP leaders’ summit, leaving the exact mid-term goals to the UNFCCC
negotiations. The Europeans again refused to make a commitment but criticized
the U.S. for failing to ratify and implement the Kyoto Protocol, to which
Connaugton repeated the argument that the protocol was not binding as it was
not enforceable, and was flawed because the U.S. and the EU together cannot
halt global emission increases without participation by China and developing
countries.
Clearly the question of binding emission reductions was a major point of
contention between the two sides, as seen in the discussion of mid-term goals
and whether developed countries must make absolute reductions in their
emissions by 2020. The U.S. side acknowledged that some nations, such as South
Korea, Italy, Spain and Greece, would find this impossible, and argued that if
the EU pressed the U.S. for absolute reductions, Washington would insist that
Austria, France, Ireland and other EU nations with a similar energy profile to
that of the U.S. to likewise commit to absolute reductions. As it was, the EU
side had to acknowledge that under the proposed plan to work towards pan-EU
reduction targets, some members would actually be permitted absolute increases
in their emissions.
Similar detailed exchanges, often on the lines of dueling statistics, took
place on the value of emissions trading schemes, such as a global carbon market
(which the U.S. argued would, in the absence of caps on all emissions, create
an incentive for some nations to avoid making real commitments to reduce
emissions), and a detailed summary of the recently-passed Energy Independence
and Security Act of 2007 (EISA), which Connaughton said locked in U.S.
mandatory mid-term commitments to address climate change.[14]
He noted that under EISA U.S. emissions will begin a downward trajectory, with
prelIminary estimates showing that the legislation will prevent 6-10 billion
metric tons of greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S. by 2030, but admitted that
the U.S. will not reduce its emissions to 1990 levels, but later. Such
reductions, however, were inadequate in light of what was needed. As
Connaughton pointed out,
‘. . .emissions from the non-OECD countries are projected to be double that of
the OECD nations by 2050, highlighting the need to engage developed countries.
A 38-gigaton reduction in projected 2050 global carbon dioxide (C02) emissions
is needed to halve global emissions, an enormous amount, given that one gigaton
of C02 equates to the savings from 273 clean, zero-emission, coal-fired power
plants, of which we currently have none. We are nowhere near the scale of what
we need to reduce emissions.”Chancellor Angela Merkel,
meeting July 8, 2008 during the 34th G8 economic summit in Toyako, Japan, which
was also the venue for the first leaders conference under the aegis of
President Bush’s Major Economies Process to bring together the major greenhouse
emitters and energy consumers to work in tandem with the UN FCCC on drafting a
new post-2012 framework agreement on climate change. Photo Credit: White House
photo by Eric Draper (photo id no. p070808ed-0027-398h.jpg)
Notes
[1] In addition to announcing the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris
treaty, other evidence of this extreme position is seen in Trump’s early
departure from the recent G7 summit in La Malbaie, Quebec, Canada (which meant
he skipped the discussion on climate change), his refusal to sign the summit
communiqué and scathing personal attacks on the Canadian prime minister. His
administration’s disdain for scientific expertise was seen in the selection of
Scott Pruitt, the former EPA administrator (who left office under a cloud of
scandal), who rejected the scientific consensus that human-generated greenhouse
emissions are driving global warming, to lead an agency that Pruitt had spent
considerable time suing.
[2] Jonathan Rich, “Losing Earth: The Decade We Almost Stopped Climate Change,”
The New York Times Magazine,
August 1, 2018.
[3] See for example Robinson Meyer, “The Problem with The New York Times’ Big Story on climate
Change,” The Atlantic,
August 1, 2018; Kate Arnoff, “What the ‘New York Times’ Climate Blockbuster Missed,”
The Nation, August 2, 2018; and
Matto Mildenberger and Leah Stokes, “No, we didn’t almost solve the climate crisis in the 1980s,”
Vox, August 6, 2018.
[4]U.S. Climate Change Policy in the 1980s, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book no. 536,
posted December 2, 2015.
[5] For documentation on the Clinton White House and climate change
negotiations, see the following two EBB’s: Kyoto
Redux? Obama’s Challenges at Copenhagen Echo Clinton’s at Kyoto,
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 303, Posted December 18,
2009; and The Clinton White House and Climate Change: The Struggle to
Restore U.S. Leadership, National Security Archive Electronic
Briefing Book no. 537, posted December 11, 2015
[6] Whitman has told her side of the story in It’s My Party Too: The Battle for the Heart
of the GOP and the Future of America (Penguin Press, New York.
2005), pp.168-181. O’Neill’s and Whitman’s efforts are discussed in Ron
Suskind’s The Price of Loyalty: George W.
Bush, the White House, and the Education of Paul O’Neill (Simon
& Schuster, New York, 2004), pp.98-106, 109-110, 113-114, 118-122. These
accounts provide essential context for Documents 10-14.
[7] For information on the Forum, see “Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate Change.
[8] See United States withdrawal from the Paris Agreement.
[9] The U.S. Global Change Research Program was established by
Presidential Initiative in 1989 and mandated by Congress in the Global Change
Research Act (GCRA) of 1990. Its purpose was to develop and coordinate “a
comprehensive and integrated United States research program which will assist
the Nation and the world to understand, assess, predict, and respond to
human-induced and natural processes of global change;” see Legal
Mandate.
[10] Suskind, The Price of Loyalty, pp. 103-104.
[11]Suskind, The Price of Loyalty
[12] Official documentation on the Milan meeting.
[13]A New International Climate Change Framework, May 31, 2007. Additional information about the process, and the
first two meetings held under its aegis can be found on the Bush
White House archived website.
[14] This act, usually referred to as EISA, was designed ““to move the
United States toward greater energy independence and security, to increase the
production of clean renewable fuels, to protect consumers, to increase the
efficiency of products, buildings, and vehicles, to promote research on and
deploy greenhouse gas capture and storage options, and to improve the energy performance
of the Federal Government, and for other purposes.” Specific titles of the act
established goals for improving automobile fuel economic standards; work on
biofuels; new efficiency standards for domestic appliance and light energy
efficiency; and steps to increase overall domestic, commercial, Federal and
industry energy efficiency. For further details see Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007.
