Not full-blown war but covert
operations can help India keep Pakistan on the edge
India should
strike preemptively, decisively and repeatedly to force compellence on
Pakistan.
After Pulwama, a full-scale conventional war with Pakistan to
inflict a decisive defeat is not in the realm of reality, given the
nuclear backdrop.
Instead, India’s strategy has to be a
combination of covert operations in Pakistan and direct military action below
the nuclear threshold over a prolonged period. This will enable India
to achieve its political aim of forcing compellence on Pakistan to stop
interfering in our internal affairs.
Pakistan’s strategy
Pakistan’s unambiguous political aim is to
seize the Muslim-dominated areas of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and seek parity
with India in the comity of nations.
In pursuit of this aim, it follows a long-term
national security strategy, which is backed by a national consensus, and wages
a calibrated hybrid war. Pakistan has persevered with this strategy despite all
diplomatic, economic and military odds. The 14 February Pulwama terrorist
attack is only its latest manifestation.
In a nutshell, the essential features of
Pakistan’s strategy are:
- Wage a fourth-generation war in J&K
and hinterland of India. - Launch quid pro quo response to
retributory Indian operations below the threshold of war. - Avoid a conventional war; if forced,
stalemate India’s conventional superiority with a combination of
dissuasive conventional capability and “irrational nuclear brinkmanship”. - Politically/militarily manage India’s
counter fourth-generation war (as perceived) within acceptable limits.
Gaps in India’s strategy
Pakistan’s strategy has been eminently
successful because it has checkmated a much more powerful adversary. Every
major terrorist attack in India over the last two decades has led to political
and public outrage. But our rare military responses have lacked strategic
vision and a logical conclusion, as seen with Operation Parakram in 2001-02 and
the ‘one off’ surgical strikes in September 2016.
This is because we do not have a
comprehensive, long-term National Security Strategy to counter Pakistan’s
hybrid war in a nuclear backdrop. In its absence, our responses are not
carefully calibrated and we end up in a crisis management mode
after every terrorist attack.
It is never too late to formalise a
comprehensive National Security Strategy and initiate long overdue reforms
in higher defence management and modernisation of armed forces. Let
Pulwama be the turning point for that.
Nevertheless, national interest demands a
measured response to the Pulwama terror attack.
Although our technological-military edge over
Pakistan has got diluted over the last two decades, we still have adequate
military capacity to achieve our political aim of forcing compellence on
Pakistan. The essential ingredients of a possible strategy are:
- Counter fourth-generation war in Pakistan by exploiting
its fault lines. - Launch operations below the threshold of
war focusing on terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and
elsewhere in Pakistan. - Engage in a proactive limited war at
a time of own choosing to compel Pakistan to stop fourth-generation war in
J&K and hinterland of India.
Engage Pakistan on all fronts
Waging a counter fourth-generation war,
exploiting Pakistan’s fault lines, was and is the most cost-effective option
for India. Baloch, Pashtun and Balti ‘nationalism’ and the sectarian
divide between the Sunnis, Shias and Ahmadiyas are tailormade for this.
Since the subject is in the covert domain, to
what extent Chanakya’s Kuttayudha (the art of covert
warfare) has been exploited by India is hard to tell. Had this
option been efficiently exploited, Masood Azhar and Hafiz Saeed would
not have been plotting attacks on India, and the Pakistan Army would have been
reeling under a series of attacks by ‘unknown assailants’ post-Uri or
post-Pulwama.
In my view, this is the best long-term option
and must be relentlessly pursued in collaboration with Iran and Afghanistan.
Operations below threshold of war
Across the Line of Control (LoC), such
operations can be in the form of fire assaults, special forces’ raids,
air/drone/missile strikes or small-scale operations to capture selected enemy
posts. These operations lie in the tactical realm and are used proactively
across the LoC as part of the ongoing operational strategy or for quid pro quo
retribution.
Across the international border, similar
actions on targets, such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed hubs at
Muridke and Bahawalpur, would fall in the strategic realm. In the absence of an
overwhelming technological-military edge like the US, India will have to
consider a quid pro quo response and even the risk of escalation from Pakistan.
If we had a long-term strategy in place, such
operations could have been launched in 24-48 hours. Nevertheless, any of these
options can still be exercised at a time that India chooses.
Proactive limited war
There is adequate space for a short and
intense limited war below the nuclear threshold. However, such an option must
be exercised preemptively when the adversary least expects it. This is not a
retributory option.
When restricted to J&K, this option is
likely to give a bigger window before nuclear weapons actually come into play.
The ongoing proxy war waged from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir provides enough
justification to exercise this option, which is best timed during summers in
J&K.
We should adopt a strategic defensive posture
in the territory outside J&K and declare the same to the world. If Pakistan
escalates the war outside J&K, we should decimate its air force, navy and
mechanised forces. In 10 days, the LoC will be pushed back 10-15 km before
nuclear weapons come into play, and we would be threatening their strategic
objectives. All launch pads used for facilitating infiltration would be
captured. This option would force Pakistan to the negotiating table as the
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor would come under threat.
We must not hastily blow the war bugle, egged
on by public sentiment or for short-term political gains. India needs to keep
Pakistan on the edge with calibrated execution of its strategy. It should
strike preemptively, strike decisively and strike repeatedly until the
political aim is achieved.
Lt Gen H S Panag PVSM, AVSM (R)
served in the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and
Central Command. Post retirement, he was Member of Armed Forces Tribunal.
From interviews to news reports,
catch ThePrint live in action on our YouTube channel. Subscribe here
.
